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COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

OCTOBER 2017

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ACRONYMS

ACR	Colombian Agency for Reintegration
ARN	Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization
BACRIM	<i>Bandas Criminales</i>
CDCS	Country Development and Cooperation Strategy
CH&A	Children & Adolescents
CHS-2F	Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment
CIPRUNNA	Inter-Sectorial Commission on Recruitment Prevention/ <i>Comisión Intersectorial de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes</i>
Conpes	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ELN	National Liberation Army/ <i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i>
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ <i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GOC	Government of Colombia
IAG	Illegal Armed Group(s)
ICBF	Colombian Family Welfare Institute
IOM (OIM)	International Organization for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MVRO	Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Maps
OVP	Office of Vulnerable Population
RPR	Reintegration and Prevention of Recruitment
SAC	Special Assistance Center
SAP	Specialized Assistance Program
SENA	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
Victim's Unit	Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation/ <i>Unidad Para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas</i>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION PURPOSE, QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess if the CHS-F2 program (2012-2015) achieved its expected results and to determine if and how those results align with the Government of Colombia's (GOC) programs to reintegrate former child soldiers. In the Colombian context, the latter is referred to as the disengagement of children and adolescents (CH&A) and the restoration of their rights as children and citizens. The evaluation also looks at CHS-F2 efforts to prevent the recruitment and use of children and youth by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

The evaluation identifies lessons learned from program implementation and offers recommendations and policy options for current and future programming. The evaluation questions, as identified in the Scope of Work, are:

Table 1. List of Evaluation Questions and Codes

Code	Evaluation Question (EQ)
EQ1	To what extent has the CH-2F supported the GOC policies and programs to reintegrate child soldiers?
EQ2	What are the strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned from the institutional reintegration route and alternative models for child soldiers of each one of the models supported by CHS-2F?
EQ3	What have been the key challenges and bottlenecks in the GOC child soldiers' reintegration process supported by CHS-F2?
EQ4	What results has CH-2F achieved in the four key intervention areas (institutional strengthening, assistance to the reintegration of child soldiers, prevention of recruitment, and knowledge management?)
EQ5	Which are the strategic areas in which the international community, especially USAID, can continue to support the GOC to achieve prevention of recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups? This question seeks to identify the most strategic approach to support GOC efforts to fight recruitment and use of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups and organized crime bands (BACRIM).

The Colombia CHS-F2 evaluation team used several data collection methods. These included reviewing documents, conducting 48 key informant interviews, 6 focus group discussions and an on-line survey of targeted stakeholders. The in-person data collection was conducted in the municipalities of Bogota and Soacha in the department of Cundinamarca, in the municipalities of Cali and Santander de Quiliche in the department of Cauca, Cartagena in the department of Bolivar, and in the municipality of Villavicencio in the department of Meta during a four-week period, May 10-June 16, 2017. The targeted stakeholder survey was conducted over a 13-day period, July 27-August 11, 2017. It was sent to 29 institutions and 53 individuals and the questions focused on the impact of the CHS-F2 program, recruitment prevention and recommendations for future programming.

An important challenge to gathering both the qualitative and quantitative research was presented by the fact that the evaluation was conducted 20 months after the CHS-F2 program ended. The team found a

high turnover of GOC officials, lack of institutional memory and the current focus on post-conflict needs. The team did its best to identify and locate informants that had worked directly on the CHS-F2 program. The team acknowledges that the ex-post facto nature of the evaluation also had benefits, primarily the ability to evaluate the long-term sustainability of the program. This is discussed further in the limitations section.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The strategic objective of the 17-year Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment Program (CHS) was to strengthen the Government of Colombia's (GOC) capacity to assist disengaged children and youth at risk of recruitment or use by illegal armed actors. The International Organization implemented the technical assistance program for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with some 13 state and government entities at the national and local level, Colombian civil society organizations and Colombian officials and consultants.

DI has been charged with evaluating the final phase (known as CHS-F2) of the program from 2012 to 2015, with a total budget of \$12 million. The evaluation encompasses the program's second phase, which ran from January 2012 to December 2014, with an initial budget of \$9, and the final extension through December 31, 2015, with an additional budget of \$3.3 million.

The goals of the CHS-F2 program were to expand and institutionalize initiatives developed in the previous programs and to complete the institutional strengthening process of both the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and the Inter-Sectorial Commission on Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA.) ICBF manages the disengagement of CH&A and CIPRUNA is an inter-agency working group on prevention of recruitment and use of CH&A by illegal groups and criminal organizations. CHS-F2 provided technical assistance to produce methodologies, studies, policy documents, publications, and workshops. It funded long-term consultants that worked inside ICBF and CIPRUNA and short-term technical consultants. The program also procured limited amounts of supplies and equipment for counterparts. The program further developed prevention and social inclusion methodologies, piloted initiatives with at-risk-youth and supported the GOC to respond to the adoption in June 2011 of the Victims and Land Restitution Law ("Victims Law").

The 2015 extension phase occurred in the context of the ongoing peace process between the GOC and FARC guerrillas. (The peace process began in September 2012 and culminated in November 2016 when the Colombian Congress ratified the final peace accords.) At the time of the extension, it was expected that ICBF would be assisting massive numbers of disengaged CH&A from the FARC. CHS-F2 assisted ICBF to prepare for this contingency. To date, only 86 CH&A have been formally released from the FARC's ranks as part of the peace process. The extension also supported the design and implementation of methodologies for the creation of ICBF's community-based assistance model with an indigenous community and the family reunification/family ties model for disengaged CH&A.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EVALUATION QUESTION 1:

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CH-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS?

Findings

IOM provided strong technical support to several Colombian government and state entities at the national and local level that played roles in reintegrating CH&A and restoring their rights. The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) is the government agency primarily responsible for overseeing the disengagement of CH&A and the restoration of their rights as children. IOM also supported several state entities with human rights roles, including the Ombudsman Office/*Defensor del*

Pueblo and the Office of the Inspector General/*Procurador General de Colombia*, and the GOC's Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation/*Unidad Para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas* ("Victim's Unit") which manages indemnizations, reparations and support for victims of the conflict.

CHS-F2 provided crucial support to ICBF to consolidate its institutional capacity to reintegrate child soldiers. It achieved this by providing technical assistance, transferring methodologies, and piloting several new successful reintegration initiatives, i.e. the reestablishment of family ties for CH&A who are unable to return immediately to their families, reintegration and reconciliation with the Nasa indigenous community, and the rural based-indigenous youth model, INGRUMA. After a close review of official documents and based on interviews with ICBF officials, the evaluation team concluded that there is a lack of an integrated gender perspective in ICBF's assistance to CH&A.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2:

WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND LESSONS LEARNED OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REINTEGRATION AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR EACH ONE OF THE MODELS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2?

Findings

The CHS-F2 (2012-2015) program built on the lessons learned of IOM's 2009-2011 program. CHS-F2 was designed to document and systemize successful practices; to connect families and communities to the reintegration process to a greater degree; and to develop differential or tailored models to assist the CH&A (i.e. a community-based model with an indigenous community, an activity to reestablish and strengthen family ties, a rural model with indigenous CH&A. CHF-F2 worked with ICBF to design initiatives to expand the pathways available to restore their rights as children and citizens and to integrate them productively into society.

CHS-F2 piloted differential or tailored approaches for indigenous communities and to aid in the restoration of family ties between the disengaged CH&A and a family member. The evaluation team interviewed the operators of the institutional model, managed/foster home and the differential approach of the Nasa indigenous community. Due to logistical constraints, the team was unable to visit and conduct interviews at the rural based model for indigenous youth called INGRUMA.

The previous CHS programs had strengthen the basic ICBF models designed to assist disengaged children and youth and to restore their rights. These models include: 1) institutional model/*modelo institucional*, where the CH&A lives and studies in Special Assistance Center (SAC); 2) protective house/*hogar protector*, where the CH&A returns and lives with his family; 3) managed home/*hogar gestor*, where the CH&A is placed in a special program of foster care.

The team notes that IOM reports and interviews show it put considerable effort overall into gender initiatives. However, two years after the programs end, the team found little evidence that gender-based approaches had made an impact and been consolidated in ICBF reintegration assistance work. Similarly, the team did not find evidence of differential approach for Afro-descendent CH&A.

Respondents to DI's targeted survey recommended that the education and job training component of the reintegration/disengagement program be strengthen, as both a reintegration and recruitment prevention strategy.

Conclusions

The GOC's route for the disengagement of children and adolescents (CH&A) met its basic objectives. According to the performance monitor, 990 CH&A were assisted during the 2012-2015 period. This is 113% over CHS-F2 target. At this time, the GOC is largely prepared to assume full responsibility for reintegration of disengaged children. The Colombian state met its international and moral obligations under International Humanitarian Law and Colombian law to disengage children from the armed conflict,

to restore their rights as citizens, and to provide them with financial reparations. The CHS program, working with ICBF and other key Colombian and international actors, played crucial role in helping Colombia meet its obligations. As of May 31, 2017, only 317 CH&A remain in the Specialized Assistance Program. An additional 86 CH&A released from the FARC ranks in 2017 are likely to access ICBF's assistance in the near future. It remains to be seen if CH&A from the ELN ranks will be released to the GOC as the result of on-going peace negotiations between the ELN guerrillas and GOC.

The institutional route through the residential programs run by Don Bosco has been successful in providing all aspects of the needs of disengagement and restoration of rights. The foster care and residence programs have been in general quite successful. However, local municipalities where the foster care is located are often reluctant to integrate these children into the regular school system.

Of the three routes available to CH&A, the first, return to their families, raises the most questions, as there is no data on this route available. The team did not have access to disengaged CH&A or their families because of confidentiality and security concerns.

However, many KII emphasized the importance of the family for successful reintegration of the CH&A and several ICBF officials at the national and local level told the team that the family reunions were highly successful and key to helping the disengaged CH&A reconnect and integrate into family and community. In this regard, the CHS-F2 more than met its performance target by 122%. 609 disengaged CH&A received assistance through socio-familial and community models. At the same time, CHS-F2 did not meet its targets regarding the percentage of disengaged CH&A receiving tailored services. Its target was for 63% of CH&A to receive tailored services, while only 35% did receive such services.

Therefore, emphasis should be placed on further developing the differential approaches for indigenous communities that were piloted in CHS-F2. The program would benefit from the further development of programs that have a rural, urban and Afro-descendent focus, depending on the background of the CH&A.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3:

WHAT HAVE BEEN THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS IN THE GOC CHILD SOLDIERS' REINTEGRATION PROCESS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? WHAT ARE THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS WHEN DISAGGREGATING THE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS?

Findings

The Colombian government developed a comprehensive program for the disengagement of CH&A combatants from the illegal armed groups. In most cases, these young people were provided with health care, counseling and educational and training opportunities that they would not ordinarily have had access to if they had not become members and then left an illegal armed group.

Despite these accomplishments, there are challenges and bottlenecks in the CH&A disengagement program. These include:

- We simply do not know what happens to most of the CH&A who have gone through the program. The GOC, either through ICBF or another government entity, does not keep track of the participants once they turn 18 years old. When they leave ICBF's purview, they become eligible to receive reparations and support from the Victim's Unit and for benefits and services from the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), which attends demobilized adult combatants. However, the three government entities that potentially interact with the disengaged former child soldier do not coordinate to follow his/her path.
- There has not been an adequate impact study by the GOC or another entity of ICBF's comprehensive program or a full survey of beneficiaries' life trajectories upon completing the ICBF program.

- An unknown number of child soldiers return to their own or other communities without going through the ICBF program.
- Families, or a family member, need to be more closely involved in the disengagement and reintegration process. ICBF's program of family reunification meetings that were developed under CHS-F2 is deemed highly successful by ICBF and Ombudsman staff. However, without outside financial support, these family meetings are severely limited by ICBF's scarce budget.
- The degree of psycho-social trauma among disengaged child combatants has thus far overwhelmed the ability of ICBF and the Colombian health system to provide trained counselors.
- ICBF tracks the number of girls and boys and the ethnic backgrounds of CH&A participating in the disengagement program. However, the ethnic, gender and community dimensions of the program were all under-developed when compared with their potential. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian CH&A are overrepresented among the ranks of child soldiers as compared with their general numbers in the population. At the current time, a differential program for girls (some 30% of CH&A) or Afro-Colombian CH&A (some 30%) is lacking. There is a limited differential program for indigenous CH&A through the INGRUMA and Nasa-community models.

Conclusions

The more comprehensive programs envisioned in the 2012-2015 CHS merit further development and consolidation, including the rural and urban models, differentiated approach based on ethnicity, and a cross-cutting gender dimension to all programming. The team understands that USAID/IOM's Recruitment Prevention Program (2016-2018) continues to work in these areas and to adapt to dynamics of the country's context. CH&A continue to be recruited into illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. However, they are more likely to stay in their communities rather than be deployed to another geographical area. This reality calls for community-based programs.

The DI team understands the different disengagement models and finds them satisfactory in terms of restoring the rights of CH&A and providing them basic social services. However, the lack of a monitoring mechanism to track and support them and their progress in remaking their lives after they leave IBCF is of great concern to the team.

Similarly, based on the information collected from interviews with officials at ICBF, the Victims Office and ACR, there is little coordination between these three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A. A former disengaged youth could potentially interact and receive benefits from all three entities at different times in his/her life. The success of the educational and training opportunities to equip disengaged CH&A with employable skills is also not tracked or evaluated.

There is no evidence suggesting there is an interest to establish a monitoring mechanism for the CH&A who went through the ICBF program, although IOM piloted a successful tracking program in 2008. There is talk of establishing a monitoring mechanism for the 86 CH&A who have been released by the FARC under the terms of the peace process.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4:

WHAT RESULTS HAS CHS-2F ACHIEVED IN THE FOUR KEY INTERVENTION AREAS (INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING, ASSISTANCE TO REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS, PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT?) (INCORPORATE MONITOR STUFF HERE)

Assistance to Reintegration of Child Soldiers

Findings:

USAID and OIM have successfully worked with GOC agencies, particularly ICBF, its operators, certain local authorities and an indigenous community to provide routes for the disengagement of CH&A and the restoration of their rights. The performance monitor indicates that CHS-F2 reached 990 CH&A, or the entire universe of ICBF beneficiaries, during 2012-2015. In doing so, CHS-F2 achieved the following results:

- Raised the profile and created greater awareness of disengaged CH&A as a class of victims that had been largely overlooked;
- Facilitated the strengthening of both national agencies and regional and local government for assisting with the disengagement of CH&A combatants and the restitution of rights;
- Helped place the situation of CH&A squarely on the negotiating table in Havana and in the peace accords;
- Advanced public policy in the area of disengaged CH&A;
- Assisted 990 former child soldiers to have an opportunity to live a fuller and more productive life;
- Supported national and local programs whose funding over time has been transferred to the Colombian government;
- Developed and transferred successful methodologies, such as the family ties/reunification model, into ICBF's core work.

Institutional Strengthening and Knowledge Management

Findings:

CHS-F2 created and supported two GOC "Observatories" the ICBF Child Welfare Observatory and the Observatory of CIPRUNA's Technical Secretariat, both founded in 2012. During 2012-2015, the Observatories produced methodologies, and publications. The CIPRUNA observatory enjoyed more political support and relevance when it was under the purview of VP Angelino Garzon (2010-2014) than it has over the last three years. ICBF's Child Welfare Observatory has produced a number of infographics and studies, but people consulted outside of ICBF did not use or consult this information.

Conclusions:

While CIPRUNA worked dynamically and functioned effectively for most of CHS-F2, the DI team identified a number of current problems that limit its potential. These include: scarce resources and constant rotation of personnel, lack of coordination, dialogue and commitment among the 29 entities composing CIPRUNA, lack of quorum and general disinterest to hold regular meetings, inability to work throughout the entire territory due to the presence of armed actors and staff shortages. These problems aside, it is clear that IOM's support and that of several dedicated IOM-financed consultants inside CIPRUNA has been decisive in keeping CIPRUNA afloat.

Prevention of Recruitment

Findings:

The CHS-F2's prevention work focused on: a) implementation of public policy advocacy at the local level in high-risk areas; b) collaborating with the Technical Secretariat of the new Inter-Sectorial Commission for the Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA) on prevention plans and working on youth integration; and c) social inclusion strategies with the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.

Conclusions:

The team found CHS-F2's prevention work with vulnerable youth to be thoughtfully, creatively and intelligently conceived and implemented. In general, during 2012-2015, the programs in rural areas were designed for the prevention of recruitment into the illegal armed groups, FARC, ELN and Bacrim. In urban areas, the concern from 2012 -2015, and continuing into the present has been the recruitment into gangs, many of which have ties to organized crime or one of the illegal armed groups. All the areas we visited noted a steady upturn in drug consumption throughout the entire period but accelerating post -2015.

Yet despite growing attention, all of these activities are underfunded and strain for high-level attention from governors, mayors and senior-level national officials. In most cases, highly dedicated public servants, professionals and dedicated CSO's and religious groups who work with limited resources run them and appreciate IOM assistance.

EVALUATION QUESTION 5:

WHICH ARE THE STRATEGIC AREAS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY USAID, CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOC TO ACHIEVE PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS? THIS QUESTION SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THE MOST STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SUPPORT GOC EFFORTS TO FIGHT RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL BANDS (BACRIM.)

Findings

The structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, lack of state presence and social services, and presence of criminal groups and illicit activities that make youth in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment and use by armed groups remains largely unchanged. Despite the end of the conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the concomitant decrease of CH&A within ICBF's SAP program, CH&A continue to face similar and evolving recruitment patterns by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

The international community's specific concerns include the power vacuum of power left by the FARC in the regions that they once dominate, the situation of CH&A soldiers from the FARC ranks who spontaneously demobilized, outside formal peace process, and apparently returned to already vulnerable communities with historic levels of coca production and high-level of violence. The international community is also concerned with the situation of CH&A living near-by the 26 remote transitional zones where the FARC has concentrated under the peace agreement. In addition, there is great concern with respect to the levels of gender-based violence, child labor, trafficking and sexual exploitation of CH&A by illegal armed groups and organized criminal bands.

Conclusions

Given the signing of the peace accords and the clear commitment by the international community to supporting the peace process, there is an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen the CH&A recruitment prevention program, adapted to the needs of the post-peace accord environment. The technical experience, partnerships, trust and credibility developed by CHS program provide an excellent foundation for an expanded and robust CH&A recruitment prevention program. Given the peace accords, there are greater opportunities for coordinated aid strategies with the GOC and international community on prevention programs as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Mission-Wide Recommendations

- Recognize youth as key to peace-building and economic development. Support their active engagement with state institutions (schools, community projects, elections).

- Identify USG inter-agency initiatives that could reinforce synergies to promote youth-related strategies. Conduct a USAID cross-sectorial youth assessment in anticipation of the next Colombia Country Development Strategy.
- Formalize and deepen implementation of USAID's "Youth for Development" policy (October 2012) by strengthening youth programming, participation, and partnerships, and by integrating youth issues and engagement across mission initiatives and programming.
- Engage in policy dialogue with state and government institutions/officials and presidential candidates on youth issues.
- Encourage development and approval of GOC policy on prevention (i.e. new Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (Conpes.)

Recommendations on the Reintegration of Child Soldiers

- The team recommends sustained focus on designing and implementing tailored programs that benefit indigenous and Afro-descendent CH&A, with adjustments for local customs and culture. A rural model, based on the successful Nasa community indigenous model, could be developed.
- The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the CH&A to greater involvement with families and with communities. The current post-Accord environment will require such program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of victims, families, communities and adult former combatants in a more integral manner.
- Gender integration into ICBF's disengagement program merits continued and sustained attention.
- The program needs to vastly expand resources and trained professionals to address the mental health and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers.
- Improve coordination between three government entities that provide services and benefits to disengaged youth: ICBF, ACR, and Victims Unit.
- Replicate Nasa-indigenous community model to other indigenous or rural communities where disengaged children or vulnerable youth reside.
- Establish a system to accompany disengaged youth after they leave the ICBF program and support them in job placement.
- Develop programs that strengthen the family structure in high-priority municipalities identified by the Office of the High Commissioner for Post-Conflict.

Recommendations to Address Bottlenecks and Challenges in the Reintegration Process

- Develop a coordination and data-sharing mechanism between the three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A, including the ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR.
- Develop a mechanism to track and support CH&A and their progress in remaking their lives after they leave IBCF. The monitoring mechanism can be modeled after IOM's successful pilot, CRO-J, which included job training for labor insertion. Respondents to DI's targeted survey recommended educational and job training tied to the labor market as key to reintegration success and recruitment prevention.

- Expand and consolidate the differential approach and gender perspective in the reintegration models.

Recommendations related to Prevention of Recruitment

- Adapt current USAID-IOM “Reintegration Program” to work in the high-priority zones identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict”
- Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention program but have never been adequately funded.
- Support the implementation of the updated GOC Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (Conpes) - equivalent to the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon to be released by the Directorate of National Planning.
- Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and incorporate strategies.
- Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver for recruitment and use into armed groups.
- Extend USAID’s current “Reintegration Program” with IOM to receptor communities where FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating.
- Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level with a focus not only on vulnerable youth but also on the family and community structures that are keys to prevention.

INTRODUCTION

Democracy International (DI) hereby presents its final performance evaluation of the USAID/Colombia Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS-2F) Program. In 2001, USAID launched a full-fledged program and a long-term commitment to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to respond to the needs of children leaving illegal armed groups. USAID started its support through a small pilot project in 1999. Over the past 17 years, USAID has supported the GOC to successfully develop both the legal/human rights norms and the institutional architecture for handling the reintegration of some 5,000 children into civilian life. It has also contributed to efforts by the GOC and civil society organizations to prevent youth recruitment by armed illegal actors and criminal networks. During this time, the International Organization for Migration (IOM/OIM) has been USAID's implementing partner and the GOC's close and effective collaborator.

USAID's Program to Support Child Ex-Combatants (CHS) consisted of several phases: the First Phase, which was implemented from 2001 to 2008; the Second Phase, originally planned for three years from 2009 to 2011 and was then extended two additional years, from January 2012 to December 2014. The third phase of the program which went throughout 2015 and was the final extension of the program. DI was charged with evaluating the second and third phases of the USAID program during the timeframe of January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015 (CHS-2F).

The overall objectives of the CHS-F2 program were to consolidate progress made in the previous phases of the program; to strengthen institutions and prepare for the full hand-over ('Colombianization') of all assistance activities to the GOC; and to document and transfer knowledge of methodologies, guidelines, lessons learned and experiences to Colombian stakeholders. It is important to note that USAID and IOM did not provide direct assistance to disengaged CH&A; rather the GOC, in conformity with Colombian and US law, was responsible for this task.

During the Second Phase (2012-2014) the program components focused on providing technical assistance for 1) Assistance for Disengaged Children; 2) Recruitment Prevention; and 3) Institutional Strengthening. The Third and Final Phase was based on needs around the on-going peace process between the GOC and FARC guerrillas. Along with the same three components mentioned above, it incorporated a Peace Pedagogy component. Some of the strategies and methodologies developed under the CHS-2F program are now being implemented under USAID/IOM's Reintegration and Prevention of Recruitment (RPR) Program (2016-2018.)

The primary purposes of this evaluation are (1) to assess if the CHS-2F program was able to achieve its expected results; and (2) to determine if and how those results aligned and supported the Government of Colombia's (GOC) programs to assist children and youth who disengage from illegal armed groups, to prevent recruitment and to ensure children's rights. The evaluation considers the context and impact of the peace process on the CHS-2F program and seeks to distill lessons learned from program implementation to derive recommendations and policy options for USAID/Colombia to integrate into the current and future programming. These lessons and recommendations will be presented in a clear and cogent way, with a distinct connection to evidence collected during fieldwork and corroborated by triangulating multiple types of data collected through different instruments.

The evaluation team conducted fieldwork in Colombia during a four-week period in May- June 2017 to collect primary data from USAID staff, project implementers, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. The targeted survey was conducted in August 2017. The goal of this fieldwork was to assess the performance of the CHS-2F project and to compare and contrast information collected with the projects' indicator data, with objectives and targets set by the CHS-2F Program. By triangulating information from different sources, the team was able to respond to the key evaluation questions,

substantiate and validate their findings and conclusions, and draw informed recommendations on how to incorporate lessons learned into future and current programming.

BACKGROUND

The 2012-2015 CHS program built on the successful experiences of IOM's earlier program (2009-2011) working with the Colombian government to provide special services to children and adolescents (CH&A) disengaged from illegal armed groups. It was designed to strengthen and expand the pathways available to restore their rights as children and citizens and to integrate them productively into society. This new phase was designed to systematize the more successful practices; involve families and communities to a greater degree; and develop more tailored approaches depending on rural or urban origins, ethnicity and gender.

Moreover, the renewed program represented a response to the altered political circumstances in the country following the 2010 election of Juan Manuel Santos and his call for peace. In 2011 the GoC passed the Law 1448, the "Victim's and Land Restitution Law". In 2010, they issued a national policy directive (CONPES¹ 3673) directing the government to formulate and implement policies to prevent the recruitment of minors into illegal armed groups. IOM played a key role in developing the CONPES and in adapting the Victim's Law to recognize children's rights. USAID's support presented a unique opportunity to institutionalize policies of child disengagement and prevention of recruitment within the new political context of a focus on victims, reparations and the then nascent strategy of searching for a negotiated peace with the FARC.

USAID extended the CHS program in 2014 through 2015 to accommodate the ongoing peace negotiations. The Colombian Congress ratified the peace accords in November 2016. At the time of the 2014 extension, many Colombia experts believed that a peace accord would lead to a massive disengagement of children from the FARC rank and file. The extension also envisioned a pedagogical strategy for peace and greater work with communities to prepare them for the presence of former child combatants.

The CH&A disengagement program was first conceived in 1999 to help Colombia meet its treaty commitments and moral obligations under international law. In accordance with Colombian and International Humanitarian Law governing the treatment of child combatants, children and adolescents captured on the battlefield or whom desert from an illegal armed group are to be considered victims. They cannot be detained or questioned by military forces for even a day or night, as would be the case of an adult combatant. In Colombia, CH&A must be handed over to the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF), which is charged with their welfare and the restoration of their rights. For CH&A and for the Colombian State, the process of disengaging from the war and separating from an illegal armed group is not comparable to the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs that the Colombian state has designed for adult combatants. The adult DDR programs are administered by the Ministry of Defense, in first instance, and then principally through the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), recently renamed Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN).

In the years 2012-2015, most children leaving the ranks of illegal armed groups either deserted from the ranks of the FARC and ELN, or were identified after GOC military operations. Some CH&A came

¹ A CONPES directive, issued by the National Political Economy and Social Council within the National Planning Department (DNP) is the highest planning decree issued by the government ordering all government agencies and departments to adjust their policies to comply with the guidelines and orientations specified in the directive. It is somewhat comparable to an Executive Order in the United States.

from the illegal groups that emerged post-demobilization of the AUC paramilitaries and are generally referred to as BACRIM (*Bandas Criminales*).

Once the CH&A is handed over to the ICBF, the different models of disengagement and restoration of their rights come into play. Because of issues of confidentiality and child welfare concerns, the CH&A disengagement program is run exclusively by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, ICBF and its operators. No other governmental or state organization has jurisdiction. In our interviews, few state officials at the national or local levels outside of ICBF knew about the details of the program.

When entering the ICBF program, the child or adolescent is evaluated by professionals, educators, and psychologists to determine placement into one of three models: 1) return to their families and to their hometowns, 2) placement in a specially-trained foster families 3) placement in a special residential program. These determinations are made based on issues of physical security, psycho-social concerns, medical needs, family conditions, educational and training opportunities, the individual desire of the CH&A, and availability of services and capacity within each of these options.

Some 6,000 CH&A have disengaged from the armed conflict and had their rights restored by ICBF. During CHS-F2 (2012-2015), 990 children and adolescents went through the program and were directed to one of the above models. As of May 31, 2017, there were 317 CH&A remaining under ICBF's purview. In addition, 86 CH&A released from the FARC guerrillas are being assisted under a specific program run by the Counselor for Human Rights in the Office of the President. Many of these CH&A eventually will be assisted by ICBF's program. In total, there are currently some 400 CH&A involved in a GOC-sponsored disengagement program. The GOC does not anticipate additional CH&A being disengaged from the FARC ranks, nor does it anticipate massive CH&A disengagement from other guerrilla groups- such as the ELN- in the foreseeable future.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The final performance evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies including, a desk review of program documents and other secondary sources of information, personal in-depth interviews with key informants (KII), focus group discussions (FGD) with key stakeholders, site visits to specific CHS-F2 intervention zones, and a targeted survey of stakeholders, specifically CIPRUNA personnel involved in CHS-2F implementation.

The team interviewed stakeholders that were, directly and indirectly, involved in the project between 2012 and 2015 and with on-going knowledge or institutional responsibilities related to disengaged and vulnerable CH&A and the peace process. The team visited and spoke with counterparts and beneficiaries from two ICBF models for reintegration- institutional model and the community-based model with an indigenous community. The team was sensitive to the variables of urban, rural, ethnic communities and gender, and the unique conditions in the zones visited. The team evaluated the work of two GOC entities (known as "Observatories") that were created to provide information and evidence to support government decision-making related to the protection of the rights and recruitment prevention. This evaluation took place through key informant interviews and an analysis of the program's written knowledge management products.

DATA COLLECTION TOOLS AND ANALYSIS

DI developed a list of informants based on suggestions from USAID, IOM, desk research and team members' local knowledge. The team considered the location, relationship to the project being evaluated, type of organization/position, affiliation of the informant (USAID, implementer/IOM, GOC counterpart/stakeholder, CSO counterpart, expert, media, and international community), gender, and

ethnic group. The team conducted 59 interviews, 8 focus groups with 146 individuals and a targeted survey of stakeholders.

DOCUMENT REVIEW

The team reviewed a comprehensive set of CHS documents including CHS-F2 quarterly reports, final reports, knowledge management products, the PMP, and other national and international policy documents relevant to this evaluation. In addition, the team reviewed articles describing the peace process and the current situation of CH&A.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The evaluation team conducted 59 semi-structured interviews and led 8 directed focus groups (FGD) with a wide range of key informants, totaling 80 individuals (55% women, 44% men), between May 10 and June 16, 2017. The team heard from informants directly involved in the 2012-2015 CHS-F2 program and others without direct knowledge of the project. In the case of direct beneficiaries, identification and access to disengaged CH&A is sensitive and restricted by the GOC for their security and welfare. However, the evaluation team was able to conduct two focus groups with four beneficiaries (2 females, 2 males) disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, and the CSOs and individuals that provide them with services.

The team conducted key informant interviews with the following categories of individuals:

- USAID/Colombia staff from the USAID Bogota's Office of Vulnerable Populations and the Agreement Officer's Representative (GOC)
- Chief of Party and staff of the project (IOM)
- Government of Colombia executive branch leaders and staff (GOC)
- Government of Colombia Public Ministry, Human Rights Ombudsman, Inspector General leaders and staff (GOC)
- Departmental and municipal authorities from Cauca, Meta and Bolivar departments (GOC)
- Grantees from civil society organizations and media-related groups (CSOs)
- International community (UN system)
- Direct beneficiaries and service providers to them (CH&A)

All of the interviews were conducted in person, except for one interview conducted by Skype. Most interviewees invited colleagues and staff to attend interviews, and usually three or more persons participated in a single interview session. This meant that the interview took more time and that not all the information discussed was directly relevant to the 2012-2015 period. In addition, conducting the evaluation 22 months after the project closed presented important limitations to gathering relevant information, as noted below.

The team employed a semi-structured interview approach, allowing some degree of deviation from the protocol. This allowed the interlocutor to have a partial role in determining the path of the conversation and facilitated a natural flow of conversation, which allowed follow up questions to focus on particularly useful topics that emerged during the interview.

ACTIVITY SITE VISITS

The team visited several zones where CHS-F2 activities took place from 2012 to 2015 and where activities originally supported by CHS-F2 continue to operate. Two-person teams visited Soacha, Cartagena and Villavicencio, and a three-person team visited Cali and the Nasa/Toribio indigenous community in Santander de Quilichao. The teams interviewed officials in mayor and governor's offices, local ICBF staff, CSOs grantees, communities, and vulnerable CH&A and conducted focus group discussions. The team collected information to better understand different models of reintegration and CHS-F2 initiatives related to social inclusion and prevention of the recruitment and use of CH&A by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

The evaluation team conducted 6 focus group discussions (FGD) during the site visits with 50 project beneficiaries (8 individuals on average, 52% women and 48% men). These FGD included 1) religious leaders, staff, and disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, at the Don Bosco reintegration center in Cali; 2) community leaders and CH&A from the Nasa indigenous community of Toribio in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca; 3) vulnerable boys, girls, and community leaders involved in prevention and social inclusion initiatives in Soacha, Cali, Cartagena, and Villavicencio.

These FGD allowed for exchange and discussion among direct beneficiaries of IOM's 2012-2015 activities that have continued to function in some form. The team employed an open interview approach, which allowed for a more casual conversation appropriate for the setting and population. It allowed the young interlocutors and community leaders to determine the path of the conversation and allowed them to share sensitive personal information as they saw fit.

To facilitate the team's analysis of fieldwork interviews and focus groups, the team took notes in a Word format during the fieldwork. These notes aided the team to identify interviews and focus groups that provided the richest data and to guide the team's discussions on findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on the data.

TARGETED STAKEHOLDER MINI-SURVEY

The DI team conducted a targeted stakeholder mini-survey of CIPRUNA personnel involved in CHS-2F implementation. Please refer to section below for details on the targeted stakeholder mini-survey.

PERFORMANCE MONITORING ANALYSIS

DI analyzed CHS-F2 performance monitor and found that overall the program achieved its indicator targets for reintegration, prevention and knowledge management. The indicators for the institutional strengthening component do not allow DI to carry out an analysis. The complete results from the performance monitor and recommendations on improving the indicators can be found in Annex G.

LIMITATIONS AND APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING BIAS

The CHS-F2 evaluation, like all evaluations, is subjected to several limitations. These include:

1. Ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation - The fact that evaluation occurred some 20 months after the CH-F2 program ended presented several analytical challenges, including loss of institutional memory, deterioration of actual memory, and difficulty accessing reliable sources or personnel that worked on the project during the 2012-2015 time frame. The team does recognize that the ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation allowed for a more robust examination of sustainability. The team was able to evaluate how program effect had evolved over the 20 month period and gain a more nuanced understanding of how beneficiaries retained or did not retain benefits from program involvement. This understanding of sustainability allowed the team to provide more valuable recommendations for future programming than would otherwise have been possible.

2. Staff turnover and lack of institutional memory– The high staff turnover in the GOC at the national, departmental and municipal levels and the lack of institutional memory presented challenges in accessing reliable information. Departmental and municipal elections were held in October 2015, two months before the CHS-F2 program ended, and brought in entirely new authorities to work on issues related to CHS. Some of these new authorities and the presence of other USAID/IOM programs caused confusion among some interviewees. This was less of a problem at the national level, as the Santos government was re-elected in 2014 and there were fewer turnovers of authorities. DI sought to minimize this limitation by consulting extensively with IOM and within government entities to identify as many CHS-F2 stakeholders as possible.

3. Selection bias – Although the team is unaware of informants who declined to participate in the

evaluation, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those respondents who chose to participate might differ from those who did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions or socio-demographic characteristics and experience among other factors. In mitigation, the team made informants aware of the independence of the process and the confidentiality of responses.

4. Halo Bias - There is a known tendency among respondents to underreport socially undesirable answers and to change their responses to fit with what they perceive as the social norm. The extent to which respondents will be prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some questions that call upon them to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on whom they depend for the provision of services or funding. To mitigate this limitation, the team provided the respondents with confidentiality and anonymity guarantees, conducted the meetings in private settings where respondents feel comfortable, and aimed to establish rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. For focus groups, the team held meetings in neutral locations and ensured that no grantee staff was present or able to overhear the proceedings.

5. Timeframe - The timeframe of this evaluation required a narrow, focused approach. The team was not able to generalize results across the entire population of beneficiaries reached by the project. Nevertheless, by using a mixed-methods approach and meeting with a diverse and purposively selected sample of beneficiaries, the team sought to mitigate the effects of this limitation.

The evaluation team consisted of three key experts: Team Leader, Ms. Kelly McBride, an international consultant with significant experience in issues of conflict mitigation and GOC and USAID projects related to youth, democracy, conflict and humanitarian affairs in Colombia, Ecuador and Central America; Dr. Marc Chernick, a senior conflict specialist who has studied the Colombian conflict, as well as other Latin American and international armed conflicts for over three decades, and is currently resident in Colombia on sabbatical from Georgetown University; and Mr. Hugo Navarro, a Colombian consultant with decades of international experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies and project design. In designing and implementing this evaluation, the Team has followed the guidelines outlined in USAID's Task Order accompanying the Scope of Work (Annex A). The team used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to gather data to investigate the evaluation questions, as described in more detail in the Evaluation Design and Methodology (Annex B).

The Team used four main data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), and an online survey. Information from these methods has been triangulated to ensure reliable findings, while discrepant observations and data have been noted and used as well.

TARGETED STAKEHOLDER SURVEY

The Team carried out an on-line survey consisting of 5 questions distributed among targeted officials in the Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions and Colombian non-governmental organizations involved in implementation of the CHS program. It should be noted that the survey was not sent to a random selection of institutions and individuals. Rather, the team sent the survey to as many recipients as possible given the limited contact information available. The survey was designed to supplement the information gathered through other methods, enriching the pool of data and allowing more stakeholders to have input into the evaluation. The survey was sent to 29 institutions and 53 individuals on July 27th, 2017 and the survey site was open for 13 days. The response rate was very high for an online survey: 72.4% of institutions responded to the survey and 60.4% of the officials, for a total of 32 surveys collected.

Because the population of respondents was selected nonrandomly, the survey results do not allow for statistical tests of error or significance, including margins of error. The findings are only representative

of the individuals who responded and cannot be extrapolated beyond the respondents themselves. The survey findings can therefore only be used to augment our in-depth qualitative analysis. There is still significant value in the survey in that it allowed the evaluation team to solicit input from a broader selection of respondents than would otherwise have been possible through key informant interviews and focus groups alone, but it is important to note its limitations.

TABLE 1. SURVEY SAMPLE AND RESPONSE RATE

Population	Targeted sample	Final sample	Coverage
Institutions	29	21	72.4%
Officials	53	32	60.4%

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

78.2% of the officials reached by this survey were from national government institutions that have responsibilities related to the prevention of recruitment of CH&A by illegal groups. The other survey respondents were from civil society and media-related groups (12.5%), public ministry institutions (6.3%) and the international community (3.1%), as is shown on Table 2. An important feature of this survey is that officials included in the sample were identified from two sources; first, a list provided by the GOC's Comisión Intersectorial de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (CIPRUNNA); second, a list of people that DI's evaluation team interviewed during the qualitative field work (KII list). Of the 32 completed surveys, 18 respondents are from the CIPRUNNA list (56.2%) and 14 respondents are from the key informant interview (KII) list (43.8%). This difference is taken into the analysis because people that were closer to the CHS implementation are in the KII list, and most of them were identified by USAID and IOM as key informants. By contrast, in the CIPRUNNA list, there are people that are working currently in recruitment prevention, but were not necessarily involved with CHS-F2 in the period 2012-2015. This is because there is high turnover and few career employees in GOC institutions.

TABLE 2. TYPE OF TARGETED INSTITUTIONS

Institution type	CIPRUNNA list	KII list	Total
National government – ministries	50,0%	7,1%	31,3%
National government - other entities	38,9%	57,1%	46,9%
Public Ministry	11,1%	-	6,3%
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups	-	28,6%	12,5%
International community	-	7,1%	3,1%
Number of respondents	18	14	32

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

Characteristics of survey respondents are shown on Table 3. The survey was answered mainly by women (56.2%), one third are officials with executive duties, 83.3% of respondents have 2 or more years in their current jobs, and almost all respondents work in Bogotá (87.5%).

TABLE 3. RESPONDENTS' CHARACTERISTICS

Variables	CIPRUNNA list	KII list	Total
% Men	38,9%	50,0%	43,8%
% of executive officers	16,7%	50,0%	31,3%
% officials with employment of 2 or more years in current position	88,9%	71,4%	81,3%
% of officials working in Bogotá	100,0%	71,4%	87,5%
Number of respondents	18	14	32

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

The first survey question dealt with knowledge of CHS support. 65.6% of the officers reported being familiar with CHS support. As expected, CHS is better known by KII officers and those with more labor seniority (Table 4).

TABLE 4. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CHS SUPPORT

Time in the current job	CIPRUNNA list	KII List	Total
5 years or more	37,5%	100%	64,3%
4 years	100%		100,0%
3 years	100%	100%	100,0%
2 years	0%	100%	25,0%
1 years	0%	100%	50,0%
Less than 1 year	0%	66,7%	50,0%
Total	44,4%	92,9%	65,6%

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

13 out of 29 institutions answered that they received direct support from the CHS program, or at least that they have partner institutions that are direct CHS beneficiaries (these institutions are listed on Table 12). This implies that the other institutions that responded to the survey have not received CHS support and do not work closely with institutions supported by CHS. More details on the survey can be found in Annex H.

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CHS-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS?

FINDINGS

In 2012-2015, CHS-2F focused on the systemization or documentation of knowledge of the ICBF's disengagement and restoration of rights program and supported two of ICBF's new initiatives related directly to child and youth disengagement. The program collaborated closely with the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) to develop policies and methodologies at the national level and help transfer and adapt them to the local (territorial) level. It also worked to develop and strengthen the differential approaches model, support family meetings between disengaged CH&A and selected family members, and developed a community-based assistance model with a Nasa indigenous community in Toribio, Cauca.

Building on the earlier programs, ICBF and USAID/OIM had identified the benefits of returning children and adolescents to their families. For a variety of reasons, including security concerns, distressed family situations, or a lack of ICBF and Colombian state support infrastructure, it was often not possible or desirable to return CH&A to their families and hometowns. As a result, the CHS program worked to strengthen two other models: institutional protection models with residential program run by operators in Medellin, Cali and Rio Sucio, Caldas, and the foster care model that was originally developed in 6 regional capitals (Pasto, Villavicencio, Bogotá, Medellin, Manizales, Barranquilla) where families and specifically women (*foster mothers/madres tutoras*) were specially trained to care for disengaged CH&A. It also worked to provide ICBF assistance, particularly psychosocial, life-preparation counseling and other support services to children who were able to their families.

Critically and strategically, the program worked to include disengaged CH&A in the development and implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law (June 2011.) Under the law, and in accordance with Colombian and international law, disengaged CH&A are considered to be victims of the conflict and are entitled to reparations from the GOC.

Finally, in 2015, during the final extension of CHF-F2 and in response to the peace negotiations, the program supported ICBF to develop contingency plans in the event of large-scale disengagement of CH&A from the FARC ranks.

CONCLUSIONS

- Informants repeatedly cited the development of methodologies and protocols as one of the lasting contributions of the overall CHS program. IOM transferred its established methodologies and hired consultants to develop and train local partners in the development and use of methodologies.
- ICBF's contingency plans for managing a large-scale disengagement of FARC CH&A were ultimately not activated. Only 87 CH&A from the FARC ranks were released and the Presidential Counsellor for Human Rights, rather than ICBF, is managing the immediate reception of the FARC CH&A.
- The family reunification and family ties program by ICBF is lauded by ICBF officials as a successful and necessary model to help disengaged CH&A reconnect and repair relations with their families. ICBF is still using a protocol developed with IOM support to organize the family

reunification activity. Unfortunately, the family meetings are now sporadic due to lack of ICBF funds for the activity.

- The only existing community-based assistance model with the Nasa indigenous people successfully reintegrated indigenous CH&A into the community through restorative justice and a community development/eco-tourism strategy unique to the Nasa community. However, elements of this strategy involving community service as a form of restorative justice and the development of an eco-tourism strategy could be replicated in other rural communities.
- The residential and foster care models have developed successful programs that with some exceptions have successfully met the goals of disengaging CH&A from the armed conflict, providing them with psychological services, providing access to primary and secondary education, and transferring them into skills and technical development programs through SENA and ACR (now ARN) when they turn 18 years old.

QUESTION 2: WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND LESSONS LEARNED OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REINTEGRATION AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR EACH ONE OF THE MODELS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2?

FINDINGS

The CHS-F2 (2012-2015) program built on the successful experiences of IOM's earlier program (2009-2011) by working with the GOC to provide special services to CH&A disengaged from illegal armed groups and by designing initiatives to expand the pathways available to restore their rights as citizens and integrate them productively into society. CHS-F2 was designed to systematize or document the successful practices, connect families and communities to the reintegration process to a greater degree, and develop alternative or differential models to assist the CH&A (i.e. community-based models, model to reestablish family ties, and indigenous model).

Over the course of the entire CHS program, ICBF developed four models for assisting disengaged CH&A: 1) Institutional model/*modelo institucional*. This is the first model developed to reintegrate CH&A by placing him/her into a Special Assistance Center (SAC) which is similar to a boarding school; 2) Managed home/*hogar gestor*. In this model, selected CH&A (e.g. pregnant girls or children under age 15) are placed in a special program of foster family care; 3) Protective house/*hogar protector*. In this model, the CH&A returns to live with his/her family and receives ICBF services in his/her community; and the 4) Alternative or differential reintegration models that were recently developed with indigenous communities under CHS-F2.

The DI team analyzed the CH&A disengagement models that were assisted by the 2012-2015 program and spoke to ICBF national and local officials, regional Ombudsmen/Defensor del Pueblo official charged with protecting the rights of children in Cali, and those involved with staff at the Don Bosco school in Cali (institutional model), a foster mother (managed home/*hogar gestor*) in Villavicencio, and community leaders, parents, and two disengaged CH&A from the Nasa indigenous community from Toribio, Cauca (alternative or differential model.) Strict security, confidentiality and welfare protocols prevented us from speaking directly with CH&A involved in the programs. However, the team spoke to two young adults who had disengaged via the institutional model and two young people who had disengaged via the Nasa indigenous community model.

The initial proposals at the outset of the 2012-2015 program called for strengthening the Special Assistance Program of CHS to include:

- Greater involvement, where possible, of CH&A families including family reunions for those in foster care or a Special Assistance Center;

- A broader focus on communities, particularly ones where CH&A ex-combatants might arrive directly without going through the ICBF disengagement (this had occurred with the AUC demobilization in 2006);
- And a tailored approach developing special programs for ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro-Colombian) and those with a more urban or rural background.

In practice, the CH&A disengagement route as administered by ICBF is mostly limited to the three options described above.

For CH&A integrated into foster or institutional care, IOM began a program arranging family reunions. This entailed subsidizing the travel of family members and, to the extent possible, working with family members to best involve them in the life of their child. These family reunions were to take place twice a year but have generally occurred only once annually because of a lack of resources. They were deemed highly successful though their sustainability is questionable. We were told in both Cali and in Villavicencio that recent reunions had been canceled due to lack of funds.

On the outset, the program anticipated support for different models developed around ethnicity as well as rural and urban environments. It also planned to develop a differentiated approach to gender. However, we found little evidence that these approaches or concerns were integrated into the ICBF model. There were plans to build a rural residential center in Caquetá, which were not fulfilled in the 2012-2015 period.

The most significant advancement that we saw was based on a pilot program that IOM developed in Toribio, Cauca. There IOM worked with a Nasa indigenous community on an eco-tourism project designed to reincorporate young people who had joined one of the illegal armed groups as well as to prevent recruitment and provide skills and alternative work options for the young and for the community as a whole. Given that indigenous groups are sovereign in Colombia, this program was instituted separately from the ICBF model and, as far as we could tell, has not been replicated. This program is potentially a model for many other indigenous and rural communities.

When asked about differential treatment for ethnic groups, ICBF pointed to a residential program for disengaged youths, the Ingruma Integration Center, in Rio Sucio, Cauca. The residential center provides educational and vocational training as well as psychosocial counseling. It operates in much the same manner as the residential facilities in Medellin and Cali run by the Silesian Don Bosco Foundation, which, based on our visit to Don Bosco in Cali, provide a very nurturing and pedagogical environment and has had success with the disengaged CH&A. The majority of the residents of Ingruma are indigenous and Afro-descendant. However, this in itself does not constitute a differential ethnic approach in its programs.

Similarly, the team found little evidence that gender-based approaches had been incorporated into the CHS program in an integral or crosscutting fashion. This is not an easy thing to accomplish. The CHS program did assist ICBF to develop a section on gender in its Technical Guidelines for the SAP, but like many organizations, a gendered approach requires more than a nod towards gender in its guidelines. It also requires more than workshops and studies. This is not to minimize the importance of the gender-related activities that were conducted. Rather, it is an assessment that the program has still not integrated gender as an integral variable in the process of disengaging child soldiers and restoring their rights.

CONCLUSIONS

The GOC's route for the disengagement of children and adolescents met its basic objectives. The state met its international and moral obligations under International Humanitarian Law to disengage children from the armed conflict, to provide them with reparations, and to restore their rights as citizens. The

CHS program, working with ICBF and other key Colombian and international actors, played a crucial role in helping Colombia meet its obligations.

During the 2012-2015 period, some 990 entered the ICBF program. According to an analysis, of all the child soldiers who had entered the program between 2000 and 2015, 77% did so voluntarily, which means they had abandoned the illegal armed group and presented themselves to the authorities. Meanwhile, 33% were rescued or captured in combat before entering the program. Regardless of how child soldiers enter the program, they are all considered victims and the state is obligated to provide them with security, psychosocial assistance where needed, medical treatment, and educational and training opportunities.

Of the routes available to non-Indigenous CH&A, the route of children returning to their own families raises the most questions. Data is most incomplete in this route. On one level, returning children and adolescents to their families represents the most humane response. However, this option is also where the state is least able to provide assistance, security, education, or psychosocial accompaniment. There needs to be a better system of tracing, monitoring, and working with the children.


The foster care and residence programs have been in general quite successful. However, even there, local municipalities where the foster care is located are often reluctant to integrate these children into the regular school system. The disengaged CH&A are generally older than the other children in their grade levels, so many children find themselves being sent to night school since there are no other options. Night school itself poses numerous other problems, as roaming the streets at night is not an ideal set-up for vulnerable, often traumatized, at-risk youth.

There is also a dearth of trained psychosocial assistance professionals as well as a major shortfall of resources to address the psychological and physical needs of the disengaged CH&A. Some are disabled either from an earlier period of their lives or because of injuries suffered during the war. Others have completely lost contact with their families and are unable to find them, refuse all contact or returning to their home communities, cannot contact their families for security reasons, or are psychologically traumatized from the experience of war. Some of the girls are pregnant when they enter the program. Both boys and girls often have some form of venereal disease or AIDS.

The residential programs run by Don Bosco seem to be the most successful in providing all aspects of the needs of disengagement and restoration of rights route. The professionals we met seemed committed and engaged and the former students we spoke with were clearly provided with educational opportunities, training, and in some cases access to higher education that they otherwise would not have had. The reintegration program had widened their opportunities. According to the general ICBF statistics, most originally came from a family life of extreme poverty and hopelessness. For them, even as young children, joining an illegal armed group presented one of the few avenues for survival or escape from domestic abuse and poverty. Unfortunately, these young people were only provided with basic opportunities after an illegal armed group illegally recruited them. Conclusions for this question are summarized below:

- Emphasis should be placed on developing the differential approaches long envisioned. The program would benefit from the development of programs that have a rural or urban focus depending on the background of the CH&A demobilized combatant.
- Numerous ICBF staff told the team that the family reunions were highly successful and the key to helping the disengaged CH&A reconnect and feel part of a family and community.
- More programs that work with indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, modeled where appropriate and with adjustments for local customs and culture on the successful Toribio program, are needed. ICBF and OIM could take a lead in expanding the Toribio pilot.

- The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the children and adolescents to greater involvement with families and with communities. The initial idea was that this was the best way to reach former child soldiers who had bypassed the ICBF programs and had returned to their families, their communities, or other communities. The current post-Accord environment will require a program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of victims, families, communities, and adult former combatants in a more integral manner.
- A gender component must be built into the programs directly. Women and girls have experienced the conflict and the disengagement process differently than men and boys have in ways that are still not well understood. Sexual abuse, though not limited to girls, has been more common among girls. Special psychosocial attention needs to be placed on the experience of girls in war and all aspects of programming needs to reflect this.
- The program needs vastly expanded resources and trained professionals to address the physical and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers.
- Currently, the disengagement of child soldiers program is largely unknown to the wider public. Yet, how a society treats its children and adolescents is a measure of how caring and generous that society is. The disengagement of child soldiers and the restoration of their rights should be a centerpiece of the national reconciliation process.



QUESTION 3: WHAT HAVE BEEN THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS IN THE GOC CHILD SOLDIERS' REINTEGRATION PROCESS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? WHAT ARE THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS WHEN DISAGGREGATING THE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS?

As already noted, the program, in general, works well. The Colombian government has developed a comprehensive program for the disengagement of CH&A combatants from the illegal armed groups. In most cases, these young people were provided with psycho-social counseling and educational and training opportunities that they would not ordinarily have had access to if they had not taken the

circuitous and unwelcome route of joining and leaving an Illegal Armed Group. This fact alone underscores the importance of the much larger programs involving prevention of recruitment that include making educational, training, recreational and artistic activities available to young people before they join an illegal armed group, as discussed in other parts of this report.

But there are challenges and bottlenecks in the child soldier disengagement program. Many of the weaknesses discussed in Evaluation Question 2 represent challenges and bottleneck. These include:

- An unknown percentage of child soldiers return to their own or other communities without going through the ICBF program. Many of these children have severe psychosocial trauma, drug addictions and other pathologies. Many hide their condition of ex-combatants. These children are highly vulnerable and exposed. Moreover, they join communities where many adults have experienced similar trauma, where there is tension between victims, perpetrators, and demobilized adult ex-combatants. The problem has been clearly recognized but the community programs that could address this issue, labeled "Finding Nemo" in some of the literature, were not adequately developed.
- The degree of psychosocial trauma among disengaged child combatants has thus far overwhelmed the ability of ICBF to provide trained counselors. The literature and data on the psycho-social traumas of CH&A disengaged combatants are devastating: 18% have killed at least once; 60% have seen others being killed; 70% have seen mutilated corpses; 18% have witnessed torture; 40% have shot at someone; 28% have been wounded; 3 in 10 think of suicide; many find escape in drugs and alcohol; many become overly aggressive. ICBF has created mobile units that can attend to the needs of some. But there are not enough trained psychologists to meet the needs of the CH&A in the different programs.
- As discussed in the previous evaluation question, the ethnic, gender and community dimensions of the program were all under-developed when compared with their potential. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian CH&A combatants are overrepresented among the ranks of child soldiers as compared with their general numbers in the population. According to ICBF, some 6000 CH&A have been disengaged from illegal armed actors since 1999 through a rights-based approach that includes social service delivery and frequent institutional contact while the CH&A are within ICBF's legal care. The ICBF tracks the gender and ethnic composition of the disengaged CH&A. There is no differential program for girls (some 30% of CH&A) or Afro-Colombian CH&A (some 30%), but there is a limited differential program for indigenous CH&A.
- Where possible, families need to be more closely involved. The programs of family visits were highly successful were constrained by limited resources.
- We simply do not know what happens to most of the CH&A who have gone through the program. ICBF does not keep track of the participants once they turn 18 years old. Most become eligible for reparations according to the Victim's law and are turned over to ARN, but ARN's records are incomplete.
- There has not been an adequate impact study of the program in general or a full survey of their life trajectories upon completing the programs. Foster mothers, ICBF officials, and other who closely work on the ground with residential and foster care programs assert that there is very little desertion or recidivism. But this is largely anecdotal. The data on children who return to their birth families is even more incomplete.

CONCLUSIONS

The GOC has admirably met its moral and international obligations to restore the rights of the CH&A who have been illegally recruited into the armed conflict. It has created substantive programs and

addressed the needs of over 6000 former child combatants. Few countries in the world can show similar successes.

Many of the more comprehensive programs envisioned in the 2012-2015 CHS were not fully developed, including rural and urban models, and a differentiated approach based on ethnicity as well as a cross-cutting gender dimension to all programming.

The 2016-2018 program continues to work in these areas, but the context is constantly changing. CH&A continue to be recruited into illegal armed groups, even after the disarming of the FARC. The ELN, FARC dissidents and BACRIM continue to recruit and there will still be a need to develop programs to restore the rights of children who have been victims of illegal recruitment or utilization.

As underscored in the findings, we simply do not have as complete a picture, as we should about how many children have been illegally recruited, and what happens to them when they leave and enter one of the paths available to them in the path to restore their rights.

There is no evidence there is an interest to establish a monitoring mechanism for the CH&A who went through the ICBF program, although IOM piloted a successful tracking program in 2008. There is talk of establishing a monitoring mechanism for the 86 CH&A who have been released by the FARC under the terms of the peace process.

Based on information collected through interviews of GOC officials, there is little coordination between the three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A: ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR. A former disengaged youth could potentially interact and receive benefits from all three entities at different times in his/her life. The success of the educational and training opportunities to equip disengaged CH&A with employable skills is also not tracked.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: WHAT RESULTS HAS CHS-2F ACHIEVED IN THE FOUR KEY INTERVENTION AREAS (INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING, ASSISTANCE TO REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS, PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT?)

FINDINGS

Assistance to reintegration of child soldiers

This is discussed in depth in Evaluation Questions 2 and 3. USAID and OIM have successfully worked with GOC agencies, particularly with ICBF and its operators as well as with certain local authorities and indigenous groups, to provide a route for the disengagement of CH&A and the restoration of their rights. OIM/USAID achievements include:

- Raised the profile and created greater awareness of child soldiers as a class of victims that has been largely overlooked;
- Facilitated the strengthening of both national agencies and regional and local government for assisting with the disengagement of CH&A combatants and the restitution of rights;
- Helped place the issue squarely on the negotiating table in Havana and in the peace accords;
- Advanced public policy in the area of disengaged CH&A;
- Assisted 990 of former child soldiers to have an opportunity to live fuller and more productive lives;
- Supported national and local programs whose funding over time has been or is being transferred to the Colombian government;
- And transferred methodologies of evaluation and implementation that have been fully integrated into GOC and local level government functioning.

Institutional Strengthening and Knowledge Management:

USAID and IOM worked with ICBF to create and support several "Observatories:" the ICBF Child Welfare Observatory and the Observatory of CIPRUNA's Technical Secretariat, both founded in 2012.

In 2014, IOM and ICBF moved to create regional ethnic observatories to better focus on the needs of individual regions. Through these observatories, data has been collected, organized, and evaluated on recruitment, prevention, utilization of children, sexual violence, and other issues related to children and conflict. USAID and IOM helped support the publication of bulletins focusing on thematic issues as well as dialogues and roundtables with experts. They also have created a network with similar observatories on children and conflict and conflict prevention in other countries. The aim of the observatories, as specifically requested by ICBF and CIPRUNA, was to provide expert knowledge to officials and policymakers. The roundtables and bulletins were to facilitate this exchange and the data was to help guide decision-making.

However, in all of our interviews, almost no one in a position of authority said that s/he used or benefitted from the data from the Observatories. They were simply too busy and did not pay much attention to the data, information, and analyses that have been generated. This is a problem not exclusive to ICBF and CIPRUNA. It raises a broader question of how to bridge the gap between those who generate data and analyses and those who make decisions and implement programs. The infrastructure has been put in place thanks to the assistance of USAID and OIM. Now the question is how can it best be utilized?

A similar conundrum can be found with the pedagogy for peace initiatives begun in 2014. As the peace negotiations advanced, it was evident that there was a need to advance communication and education around the implications of a peace accord as well as to work with communities and young people on issues of transitional justice, reconciliation, and a culture of peace. This was particularly evident given how disengaged much of the Colombian population was from the peace negotiations taking place in Havana, even in the zones of conflict. It was evident that the peace accords would have direct consequences on the issues of child recruitment, disengagement, and new evolving threats facing children in a post-Accord setting.

IOM commissioned a paper to create a strategy on developing peace pedagogy. IOM held workshops, communication strategies, and public events in various regions of the country. This component was not directly evaluated and it represented only a small part of IOM's program. It is clear that the program had identified one of the most important aspects and deficiencies of the peace process: apathy and a lack of public engagement. IOM's minor contribution to this problem may have had an impact on some of the youth and counselors involved. However, there is little evidence that the peace pedagogy strategy of IOM and its GOC counterparts had a broader impact on public awareness and understanding of the peace accords or of how the accords will affect their communities.

Prevention of Recruitment

The CHS-F2 program expanded work on prevention, focusing on implementation of public policy advocacy at the local level in high-risk areas. The program collaborated with the Technical Secretariat of the new Inter-Sectorial Commission for the Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA) on implementing prevention plans and working youth integration and social inclusion strategies in Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.

IOM's prevention and social inclusion strategy focuses on assisting the vulnerable youth to develop a life plan and sustainable livelihood with the goal of their social and economic inclusion. It is a rights-based human development strategy. This strategy was carried out with IOM partners in municipalities and local CSOs, such as World Coach in Cartagena, the Workshop Schools/Secular Talleres in Bogota and Cartagena, and community groups such as Fundacion Paz y Bien/Peace and Well-being Foundation in

Cartagena. The team visited all of these partners and conducted Focus Groups Discussions with youth participants and staff from these organizations.

OIM has also worked with CIPRUNA and with key municipal and departmental agencies, as well as CSOs, to implement strategies of recruitment prevention at regional, municipal, sub-municipal, such as Agua Blanca in Cali, and in specific neighborhoods and schools. Each of these was developed following the directives of the 2010 CONPES (3673) which directed the government to formulate and implement policies to prevent the recruitment of minors into illegal armed groups.

Development of various tools to promote and protect human rights is key to IOM's strategy. According to IOM municipal and CSO partners, the most widely used and effective tool was the Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Maps (MVRO.) The MVRO is a social cartography map used by a local community and municipal leaders in a participatory setting to identify risk factors and vulnerabilities. The community also identifies opportunities to address or mitigate those risks and vulnerabilities. Most importantly, the community identifies youth initiatives and a local-level action plan to address recruitment.

CONCLUSIONS

The team found CHS-F2's prevention work with vulnerable youth to be thoughtfully, creatively and intelligently conceived and implemented. The municipal and departmental authorities we visited with in Cali, Villavicencio and Cartagena had all designed programs and public policies for the prevention of youth recruitment. Collectively they covered 990 vulnerable youths. Each was fully cognizant of changing conditions of the armed conflict and tried to adjust their programs accordingly both during the 2012-2015 period and afterwards. In general, during the 2012-2015 period, the programs in rural areas were designed for the prevention of recruitment into the illegal armed groups, FARC, ELN and Bacrim. Since the signing of the peace accords with the FARC, the concern has turned to the FARC dissident groups in some areas, particularly in the areas of Meta and northern Cauca that we visited, as well as increased recruitment activities by Bacrim. They have also noted a shift to utilization of CH&A, instead of recruitment; whereby the young person continues to live with his or her family, go to school while also working with one of the illegal groups or gangs.

In urban areas, the concern from 2012 -2015, and continuing into the present has been the recruitment into gangs, many of which gangs have ties to organized crime or one of the illegal armed groups. All the areas we visited noted a steady upturn in drug consumption throughout the entire period but accelerating post -2015.

Yet despite the national, regional and local attention, all of these activities are underfunded and strain for high-level attention from governors, mayors and senior-level national officials. In most cases, highly dedicated public servants, professionals and dedicated CSO's and religious groups who make use of the limited resources they have as best they can and deeply appreciate OIM assistance, run them.

Of the latter, the partner projects that we visited in each of the regions we traveled to were also very compelling and on-target. However aside from anecdotal evidence from the state officials, of youth and partners, there is no data to prove how many youth were saved from joining a criminal group by these programs. However, the effectiveness and wide use of the MVRO was cited several times by CSO partners, municipal and ICBF staff in Cali.

QUESTION 5: WHICH ARE THE STRATEGIC AREAS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY USAID, CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOC TO ACHIEVE PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS? THIS QUESTION SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THE MOST STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SUPPORT GOC EFFORTS TO FIGHT RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL BANDS (BACRIM.)

FINDINGS

Despite the end of the conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the simultaneous decreased CH&A within ICBF's SAP program, the structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, lack of state presence and social services, and presence of criminal groups and illicit activities that make youth in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment remains largely unchanged. CH&A face the same vulnerabilities and on-going recruitment and use of CH&A by criminal organizations as always. In fact, interviews with the international community and the USG leadership found great concern about a number of facts that may lead to an increase in recruitment and use of at-risk-youth by criminal groups. These factors include the lack of effective GOC presence in the areas formally controlled by the FARC and the movement of dissident FARC and BACRIMs into these areas, a dramatic increase in coca production over the last several years, the ongoing use of migrant coca-leaf pickers, including CH&A, and increased recruitment and use of CH&A for criminal work in urban areas where drugs, addiction, and poverty are ever-present.

The international community is specifically concerned with the situation of CH&A soldiers from the FARC ranks, who spontaneously demobilized outside of the 86 known CH&A who left through the formal peace process that reportedly returned to vulnerable communities with high levels of coca production and violence. The international community is also concerned with the situation of CH&A living near the 26 remote transitional zones where the FARC has concentrated under the peace agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the signing of the peace accords and the clear commitment by the international community to supporting the peace process, there is an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen the CH&A recruitment prevention program, adapted to the needs of the post-Accord environment.

However, there is great concern with respect to the vacuums of power left by the FARC in the regions that they once dominated. From the outset of the process concentrating the FARC in specific zones to facilitate the ceasefire and disarmament process, the country has witnessed the expansion of other illegal armed groups into these zones. This issue is larger than one of just child recruitment and will require the Colombian government to address these power vacuums through the increase of state presence with investment in security, administration, education, welfare, health and infrastructure. But as the country moves towards the consolidation of the post-conflict environment, it is incumbent that the illegal armed actors and criminal groups that remain protect children from illegal recruitment.

The experience gained over the last five years by USAID provides much of the necessary foundation for an expanded and robust CH&A recruitment prevention program. Given the peace accords, there are greater opportunities to partner with other international aid organizations as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The team wishes to underline the strong success of USAID's CHS program over the past 17 years. The program supported the GOC's goals to establish the legal norms, institutional architecture, and expertise to manage the disengagement/reintegration of some 6000 CH&A. "Colombianization" of the program took place and the GOC is fully capable of dealing with CH&A disengaging from future peace process (e.g. ELN.) However, the team considers that the lack of a monitoring mechanism to gauge the effectiveness of the GOC's reintegration program to be a serious gap in the GOC's approach. There are no hard facts about whether CH&A have successfully rebuilt their lives or if CH&A have been "re-recruited" into a new criminal group.

The structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, presence of criminal groups and illicit activities, etc. that make youth in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment and use by armed groups remain unchanged, despite the end of the conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the concomitant decrease CH&A within ICBF's SAP program. CH&A face the same vulnerabilities and on-going recruitment and use of CH&A by criminal organizations continues. The change is that armed groups in or close to their communities now recruit the CH&A, and they most likely remain close to/or in their homes. Therefore, we recommend that USAID Colombia redoubles its support for prevention programs and, importantly, address the needs of all vulnerable youth, not just those associated directly with the FARC conflict, and their families and communities.

Below the team offers recommendations that are directed at the CHS program and at the USAID mission as a whole. These are focused on youth in development and prevention and social inclusion strategies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Mission-Wide Recommendations

- Recognize youth as key to peace-building and economic development. Support their active engagement with state institutions (schools, community projects, elections).
- Identify USG inter-agency initiatives that could reinforce synergies to promote youth-related strategies. Conduct a USAID cross-sectorial youth assessment in anticipation of the next Colombia Country Development Strategy.
- Formalize and deepen implementation of USAID's "Youth for Development" policy (October 2012) by strengthening youth programming, participation, and partnerships, and by integrating youth issues and engagement across mission initiatives and programming.
- Engage in policy dialogue with state and government institutions/officials and presidential candidates on youth issues.
- Encourage development and approval of GOC policy on prevention (i.e. new Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (Conpes.)

Recommendations on the Reintegration of Child Soldiers

- The team recommends sustained focus on designing and implementing tailored programs that benefit indigenous and Afro-descendent CH&A, with adjustments for local customs and culture. A rural model, based on the successful Nasa community indigenous model, could be developed.
- The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the CH&A to greater involvement with families and with communities. The current post-Accord environment will

require such program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of victims, families, communities and adult former combatants in a more integral manner.

- Gender integration into ICBF's disengagement program merits continued and sustained attention.
- The program needs to vastly expand resources and trained professionals to address the mental health and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers.
- Improve coordination between three government entities that provide services and benefits to disengaged youth: ICBF, ACR, and Victims Unit.
- Replicate Nasa-indigenous community model to other indigenous or rural communities where disengaged children or vulnerable youth reside.
- Establish a system to accompany disengaged youth after they leave the ICBF program and support them in job placement.
- Develop programs that strengthen the family structure in high-priority municipalities identified by the Office of the High Commissioner for Post-Conflict.

Recommendations to Address Bottlenecks and Challenges in the Reintegration Process

- Develop a coordination and data-sharing mechanism between the three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A, including the ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR.
- Develop a mechanism to track and support CH&A and their progress in remaking their lives after they leave IBCF. The monitoring mechanism can be modeled after IOM's successful pilot, CRO-J, which included job training for labor insertion. Respondents to DI's targeted survey recommended educational and job training tied to the labor market as key to reintegration success and recruitment prevention.
- Expand and consolidate the differential approach and gender perspective in the reintegration models.

Recommendations related to Prevention of Recruitment

- Adapt current USAID-IOM "Reintegration Program" to work in the high-priority zones identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict"
- Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention program but have never been adequately funded.
- Support the implementation of the updated GOC Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (Conpes) - equivalent to the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon to be released by the Directorate of National Planning.
- Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and incorporate strategies.
- Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver for recruitment and use into armed groups.
- Extend USAID's current "Reintegration Program" with IOM to receptor communities where FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating.

- Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level with a focus not only on vulnerable youth but also on the family and community structures that are keys to prevention.

Recommendations for CIPRUNA

The policy on recruitment prevention in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla should be reoriented mainly towards strengthening institutional capacity. This is important since it is an integral part of the peace agreements and is crucial for coordination, initiatives and work with local authorities, efficient use of resources for road-map protocols and the strengthening of investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. Thus, the presence of the government can be reinforced in areas formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla in order to prevent children from being used or linked to illegal groups or to new criminal modalities.

Likewise, for the design of reintegration programs, in addition to adopting a community-based approach, it is essential to contemplate regional, cultural and ethnic differences. These programs should be oriented towards education and job training to provide support in productive activities and the empowerment of children. For this purpose, it is important to include the children and adolescents in the design of the public policy in each territory.

Furthermore, in the strategic areas in which USAID should continue to support the Government of Colombia to prevent recruitment, use and sexual violence against children in the next 5 years, most institutions agree that programs regarding education for the labor insertion to the productive sectors and the use of free time should be supported and strengthened, especially those involving sports, arts and cultural formation with a territorial, cultural and ethnic approach.

ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 TITLE

Strategic Performance Evaluation of its Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS) Activity.

C.2 PURPOSE

The overall objective of USAID/Colombia's 2014 Country Development and Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) is to strengthen Colombia's capacity to implement a sustainable and inclusive peace. As part of this process, the Mission's Office of Vulnerable Populations (OVP) supports efforts to identify and address the opportunities and barriers for achieving sustainable peace and development in Colombia through various evaluations of its programs. After seven years of USAID programming supporting disengaged children and prevention of recruitment initiatives, OVP is conducting a strategic Performance Evaluation of its Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS) Program.

The evaluation has the purpose to clarify if the USAID/Colombia's Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS) Program was able to achieve its stated results, and if/how those results align with the Government of Colombia (GOC) programs to assist disengaged child soldiers and adult ex-combatants. This evaluation would allow Mission's Office of Vulnerable Populations (OVP) to identify lessons learned from the Program in order to inform and develop options and/or activities for the current Reintegration and Prevention of Recruitment Program (RPR). The key lessons learned from this evaluation will be shared with strategic GOC partners.

C.3 BACKGROUND

Description of the Problem, Development Hypothesis, and Theory of Change

Each year, worldwide, 300,000 children participate actively in wars.¹ They must fight, spy, explore and provide sexual services to their superiors. In approximately 75% of the armed conflicts in the world, there are child soldiers who are part of illegal armed groups (IAG), such as guerrillas, paramilitaries, insurgent groups or criminal gangs.² The use of children as combatants and their victimization by opposing actors has been a common characteristic of countries facing armed conflict in situations such as Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Colombia. Although international regulations clearly prohibit the participation of children in war, reality has shown that, on one hand, they are an easy target and on the other, there are few laws related to the prevention, detection, and repression of these acts.

Without any doubt, recruitment and use of Children and Adolescents (CH&A) in armed conflicts has generated widespread concern, as it represents the denial of the most

¹ Human Rights Watch, “Child Soldiers: The shadow of their existence”. 2007 www.warchild.nl The United Nations Coalition against the involvement of children and adolescents in armed conflict estimates the number of child soldiers to be around 250,000-300,000.

² Human Security Report, 2005. <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/human-security-report.aspx>

fundamental rights. This is the reason why, worldwide, protection of children has increased, as well as the adoption of various prevention and attention mechanisms for CH&A.

After almost 50 years, internal armed conflict continues to affect various regions and civilian populations of Colombia. In the last decade, the GOC has made several attempts at negotiating with IAGs in order to help the country transit from a state of armed conflict to one of sustained peace. Following successful peace talks with the paramilitaries, *Auto-defensas de Colombia* (AUC) in 2003, the administration of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) embarked on a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process to support the dismantling of the AUC forces. During these demobilizations, AUC commanders allegedly returned thousands of child fighters to their homes prior to mass demobilizations in order to evade legal charges. The unsatisfying AUC demobilization was a costly error for the Colombian government in dealing with child combatants. But it offers lessons for today's peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (FARC) and subsequent demobilizations of child combatants that will likely follow a signed peace agreement.

Recruiting children under the age of 15 to “participate actively in hostile activities” is a war crime according to the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the United Nations states that 18 years is the minimum age requirement to recruit persons to participate in an armed conflict. Figures differ between the Ministry of Defense, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other agencies on the numbers of children involved in the Colombia's internal conflict. While more than 5,000 children have disengaged³ from illegal groups, some claim that more than 7,500 children were recruited between 1985 and 2014 by all actors, including the guerrillas, the military and state-aligned paramilitary groups.

Through its program of specialized care, the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) has recovered over 5,900 children since 1999. The authorities recognize that one of the populations most affected by recruitment by illegal actors is indigenous groups who represent 3% of the total Colombian population. Nevertheless children from indigenous groups make up 10% of the overall number of disengaged children. Afro-Colombian disengaged child soldiers are 6% of the overall disengaged children.

229 children and adolescents entered the Colombian “special assistance program” in order to begin their reintegration back into Colombian society in 2015. Of those 229 CH&A, 39 were rescued by the armed forces. According to the latest report from the agency Allied Children, Social Development and Research (www.agenciapandi.org), most of the 7,722 children who were recruited between 1985 and 2014 were recruited before they were 14 years old. Almost 36% of them came from home environments with problems such as domestic violence.

Forced recruitment of children by IAGs continues in Colombia. In fact, it is increasing. Moreover, the recruitment age for boys and girls continues to decrease. Estimates on the number of children and adolescents recruited in Colombia show that there could be currently between 5,000 and 6,600 child soldiers participating as combatants in these groups.⁴ In the 107 municipalities prioritized by the Inter-Institutional Committee for Prevention of

³ Children disengaged from armed groups in Colombia Integration Processes in Context. 2013. Villanueva O'Driscoll, Julia' Loots, Gerrit; Derlyun, Ilse. Chapter 4, pg 73.

⁴ Updated trends on participation of children and adolescents in illegal armed groups. *Econometria* 2,009 page 94.

Recruitment and Use of Boys and Girls currently under the Ministry of Post Conflict, there are around 81,000 children and adolescents at risk of recruitment and use by illegal armed groups.

Based on the analysis of the information that the ICBF gathered from disengaged children entering the Specialized Assistance Program, the following aspects can be concluded:

- The departments of Antioquia, Caquetá and Meta continue to be the ones with higher recruitment of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups, followed by increasing trends of recruitment within the Pacific Region.
- The trend shows that San Vicente del Caguán is the municipality where most of the disengaged children are being recruited by IAG, followed by the municipalities of Planadas (Tolima), Tame (Arauca), El Bagre (Antioquia), Barbacoas (Nariño), Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá), and Puerto Guzmán (Putumayo).
- The number of disengaged children from criminal organizations (*Bandas Criminales* – BACRIM) drastically increased since 2009. In 2015, 20 children entered the ICBF reintegration program but the Colombian Interinstitutional Committee for the Prevention of Recruitment of Children and Adolescents (CIPRUNNA) estimates that the number of youth used by criminal groups could be much higher.

While the Santos government is currently engaged in peace talks with the FARC, it is unclear what the final outcome will be, including if, when, and roughly how many FARC adult and child soldiers will demobilize. While the National Liberation Army (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional* -ELN) and other BACRIM continue to recruit, according to Human Rights Watch, “approximately 80 percent of child combatants in Colombia belong to one of the two left-wing guerrilla groups, the FARC or ELN. The remaining fight in paramilitary ranks.”

Theory of Change

USAID/Colombia’s theory of change for the reintegration program links this activity as follows: If motivations and incentives for violence and participation are changed among disengaged child soldiers and ex-combatants to mitigate recidivism, and community members are engaged in the reintegration process, then ex-combatants are more likely to become law-abiding members of society accepted by their communities.

This theory of change is based on the assumption that successful reintegration will be achieved not only through a focus on adults and child ex-combatants, but also through inclusion of community members in the reintegration process. As noted above, such an approach directly links to OVP’s development objective of advancing reconciliation among victims and ex-combatants, and contributes to the overall CDCS objective.

Summary of the Activity to be evaluated

In 1999, USAID agreed to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) initiative to build a reintegration route for child soldiers. Since then two USAID programs have supported the GOC to assist child soldiers, prevent recruitment of youth at risk and support knowledge management related to the reintegration route and restitution of rights of children affected by the conflict. The programs were “Support Program for Ex-Combatant Children” from March 2001 to December 2008 with a total estimated ceiling (TEC) of USD \$13.8 million and “Institutional Strengthening Program to Support Child Ex-Combatants and Children and Youth at Risk of Recruitment by Illegal Armed Groups” from December 2008 to December 2015 with a TEC of USD\$22,872,000.

The first program (2001 – 2008) focused on improving the provision of direct assistance to children and adolescents by helping support and strengthen policies. In particular, the program strengthened the design and implementation of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) Assistance Program that began in 1999. During this first program, the main objectives included:

- Direct assistance to ex-combatant children and youth
- Strengthening and training of ICBF staff
- Consolidation of assistance modalities, especially specific needs for Afro Colombian and Indigenous communities
- Promotion of extra-institutional “family” settings
- Consolidation of pedagogic models and toolkits
- Strengthening of vocational skills training for youth
- Implementation of reparations projects to benefit ex-combatant children and youth
- Alternative methodologies for individual and community reparations and reintegration.

The second program had two phases (2008-2011) and (2012-2015). During the first phase, the program continued to improve assistance for disengaged children and adolescents by working with the ICBF and by emphasizing the prevention of recruitment and use of children and adolescents, supporting the CIPRUNNA, an inter-agency GOC working group that focuses on articulating and leading implementation of actions to prevent recruitment and use of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups and criminal groups. Objectives included in this phase include:

- Assistance: USAID provided assistance to ICBF to effectively implement the disengaged child soldier’s policy, which includes support for long-term sustainable economic and social reintegration of beneficiaries.
- Prevention: GOC implemented policy to reduce vulnerabilities of recruitment in high-risk areas by increasing national, regional and local capacities in the public, private and community networks with technical assistance provided by USAID.
- Knowledge Management and Information Dissemination: Key institutions identified and provided feedback on their lessons learned regarding assistance and prevention, while USAID worked with observatories in Colombia to generate evidence-based information in these areas.

The second phase of the second program (2012-2015) continued to implement assistance and prevention components, prioritizing support for strengthening various institutions including ICBF and CIPRUNNA. This included supporting the Childhood Observatory in both entities. Also, community reintegration models were developed and tried in indigenous and rural municipalities. The program adapted its activities to align them with the ongoing dialogues between the FARC and GOC by including peace pedagogic methodology for high school and universities, and continued support for ICBF contingency planning for massive disengagement of children and adolescents through institutional and community models.

The following are some of the results included in this phase:

- Over 5,900 child soldiers identified and assisted by ICBF's specialized assistance program
- 184,574 at-risk youth benefited from prevention strategies
- 1,159 national and local institutions strengthened
- 83 analyses led and communicated through GOC Observatories

The components of the USAID program are summarized in the following table:

Program Component	Key Activities	Primary Counterparts
Assistance to disengaged child soldiers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support institutional models and approaches - Support to family reintegration models - Support to civil society routes (indigenous communities, victims' groups and agricultural rural model) - Development of a tailored approach for various ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) -Indigenous communities and authorities -Local authorities
Prevention of recruitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to GOC policy - Institutional strengthening to 10% of municipalities at higher risk of recruitment - Use of technologies and recreational activities to empower youth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Inter-Institutional Commission for Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNNA) - GOC initiatives (Tecnoacademias⁵, ICBF's program General Welfare Program).
Knowledge Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to national and local Observatories to track rights of children in the conflict - GOC oversight system to track municipal and departmental policy compliance - Support NGOs to develop and disseminate methodologies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I- CBF, CIPRUNNA, national and local GOC authorities. Children and Adolescent Unit within the Inspector General Office - Civil society operators (World Coach, Pandi, Familia Ayara, Casa Francisco Esperanza, etc).

⁵ Schools specialized in training CH&A in technology, including robotics, nano-technology, computer design, etc.

The geographic scope of the CHS program had a national focus for it supported national policy design and assistance. Support for municipal development plans in prevention focused in the following areas (highlighted in orange on the map on page 9):

Antioquia (Olaya, Peque, Sabanalarga, San Andrés, Santa Fe de Antioquia, Toledo, Valdivia, Yarumal); Arauca (Arauquita, Fortul, Saravena); Bolívar (Cartagena, El Carmen de Bolívar, Magangué, San Jacinto, San Juan de Nepomuceno, Turbaco); Boyacá (Cubara); Caquetá (San Vicente del Caguan); Cauca (Caldono, Corinto, Guapi, El Tambo, Morales, Puerto Tejada, Silvia); Chocó (Itmina, Quibdó, Medio Atrato); Huila (Neiva, Tello); La Guajira (Dibulla, Maicao, Riohacha, Uribí); Magdalena (Aracataca, Ciénaga) Meta (Mapiripan, Puerto Gaitán, Puerto Lleras); Nariño (Ipiales, Policarpa, Ricaurte, Santa Cruz); Norte de Santander (Cúcuta, Tibú); Putumayo (Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzmán); Tolima (Planadas); Valle (Buenaventura, Cartago, Florida, Jamundí, Palmira).

The CIPRUNNA and GOC prioritized other municipalities (highlighted in grey). Those municipalities highlighted in grey did not receive any support from the CHS program due to time and resource limitations. As such, the evaluation would focus on the orange areas.

The primary audience for this Performance Evaluation is USAID/Colombia/OVP and Senior Management, as well as other USG agencies that follow the DDR process in Colombia. Secondary audiences, such as other donors and NGOs, could also benefit from the results of the evaluation.

The evaluation will address the following questions regarding the second phase of the second USAID/Colombia *Institutional Strengthening Program to Support Child Ex-combatants and Children and Young at risk of Recruitment by Illegal Armed Groups* (CHS-2F) 2012-2015:

1. **TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CHS-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS?**
 2. Which are the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned of the institutional reintegration route and alternative models for child soldiers of each one of the models supported by CHS-2F⁶?
 3. What have been the key challenges and bottlenecks in the GOC child soldiers' reintegration process supported by CHS-2F⁷? What are the key challenges and bottlenecks when disaggregating the information and analysis by gender and ethnic groups?
 4. What results has CHS-2F achieved in the four key intervention areas (institutional strengthening, assistance to reintegration of child soldiers, prevention of recruitment and knowledge management)?
 5. Which are the strategic areas in which the international community, especially USAID, can continue to support the Government of Colombia to achieve prevention of recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups⁸? This question seeks to identify the most strategic approach to support GOC efforts to fight recruitment and use of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups and organized crime bands (BACRIM).

b. Evaluation Design and Methodology

The Evaluation Team, evaluation process, and products must:

1. Review carefully all the documentation relevant to the evaluation purpose provided by USAID prior to evaluation start up. The team will study a wide range of documentation, including the Performance Monitoring Plans (PMPs), as a means of understanding and comparing both expected and actual performance. Other documents provided by USAID should be studied, such as the USAID Gender Policy, previous CHS program evaluations and special reports and the National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security.
2. Use, review and analyze the indicator data provided by the monitoring activities of CHS-2F, based on the USAID/Colombia MONITOR system.
3. Propose a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis that will help USAID/Colombia understand not only what is going on, but why. The approach will provide benchmarks for understanding ongoing progress after the evaluation.
4. Use a mix of instruments and procedures to collect the qualitative and quantitative data and information proposed
5. Obtain information and knowledge from various target audiences such as: Program Managers, Chief of Party, Governors, Mayors, community councils, USAID representatives and GOC ministry officials.
6. Obtain information of individuals from all relevant demographic groups and be able to report on differential perception, impacts, roles in decision making and experience among

⁶ Not all child soldiers have gone through the official ICBF reintegration model. Some have received alternative assistance through indigenous community models and other community support.

⁷ USAID has supported virtually all parts of the reintegration process by providing institutional strengthening to ICBF in carrying out the specialized assistance program for disengaged child soldiers

them, including: men and women, youth and elderly and Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations.

7. Capture perceptions and reality of the participation of women and their
8. Be participatory with USAID/Colombia in ways that preserve objectivity while improving the quality of data collected, collective learning, and ownership of the evaluation results.
9. Use a differentiated evaluation approach depending on the region. The Evaluation Team must engage with a selection of target municipalities. The evaluation team (and to a certain extent the questions) need to be split between the regions and national level. Questions need to be refined depending on capacity within a municipality and ICBF and CIPRUNNA presence.
10. Provide useful recommendations that are specific, actionable, time-bound and targeted to specific entities related to CHS-2F
11. Include exercises to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints for the implementing partner to effectively coordinate with national and local GOC institutions, USAID/Colombia, other USAID programs, other donors, private actors among others to achieve the required results.
12. Develop or suggest tools and/or frameworks to track progress from conception, through adoption to implementation of the key policy elements of CHS-2F
13. Retain the ability to break up into two teams to complete a demanding data collection effort and complex analytic exercise.

c. Evaluation Management

The evaluation team must demonstrate familiarity with USAID's Evaluation Policy and guidance included in the USAID Automated Directive System (ADS) in Chapter 203.

The contractor has discretion to propose an evaluation team composition with education, skills, experience, and roles, which will produce a high quality evaluation report. Additional team members and/or support staff not identified as Key Personnel may be proposed. The overall team composition must include relevant subject matter expertise, skills, and experience. The recruitment of local evaluators and/or local counterparts is highly encouraged.

The following three positions are designated as Key Personnel:

Evaluation Team Leader

The Evaluation Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with USAID, developing and implementing the detailed evaluation methodology, managing and implementing the work plan and all related evaluation team activities, leading the literature review, conducting interviews, and writing technical products (draft and final evaluation reports, PowerPoint presentations). S/he shall also be responsible for presenting findings during in-briefings, out-briefings, and final presentations.

Senior Conflict Analyst/Subject Matter Specialist

At least one senior-level conflict/subject matter specialist will serve on the evaluation team and will support the Evaluation Team Leader with research, data collection, analysis, and writing. The evaluation contractor should select a Senior Conflict Analyst/Subject Matter Expert with prior experience working in Colombia and focusing on DDR issues. Identification of highly qualified local expertise is encouraged.

Evaluation Specialist

The Evaluation Specialist will provide technical expertise in the qualitative and quantitative program evaluation methodologies, tools, and data analyses that can be applied to peacebuilding and conflict resolution programs.

C.5 LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The contractor will provide all workspace, computers, printers, internet and cell phone services and other administrative services for the Evaluation Team. USAID/Colombia will provide a letter of introduction and a list of contacts to the Evaluation Team for meetings with implementing partners, GOC representatives, program beneficiaries, and other key stakeholders and contacts.

The contractor will be responsible for providing logistical personnel covering support in an evaluation, including professional translation services, data entry, administrative assistance, operations, etc.

The Mission and/or USAID implementing partners will make available relevant documents.

The Evaluation Task Order Contracting Officer Representative (TOCOR) may observe some of the data collection efforts, but will not serve as a member of the evaluation team.

C.6 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

Per USAID Environmental Procedures, certain classes of actions may qualify for a Categorical Exclusion, pursuant to 22 CFR Section 216.2(c)(1) and (2), for which an Initial Environmental Examination, or an Environmental Assessment is not required. The activities described qualify for a categorical exclusion per 22 CFR 216 as follows:

1. Section 216.2(c)(2)(i) Education, technical assistance, or training programs except to the extent such programs include activities directly affecting the environment (such as construction of facilities, etc.);
2. Section 216.2(c)(2)(ii) Controlled experimentation exclusively for the purpose of research and field evaluation which are confined to small areas and carefully monitored;
3. Section 216.2(c)(2)(iii) Analyses, studies, academic or research workshops and meetings; and
4. Section 216.2(c)(2)(xiv) Studies, projects or programs intended to develop the capability of recipient countries to engage in development planning, except to the extent designed

to result in activities directly affecting the environment.

C.7 GENDER

Gender and vulnerable populations must be integrated into the design and implementation of the Activity. Integration of these themes should take into account women and vulnerable groups such as, but not limited to, indigenous persons, Afro-Colombians, persons with disabilities, youth, the elderly and the LGBTI community as appropriate. At a bare minimum, the Activity should address major existing inequalities and a plan to guard against exacerbating these.

C.8 GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be conducted in Colombia. Specific geographic areas that the Evaluation team plan to visit will be selected by the Evaluation Team during the planning process. For purposes of budgeting, Contractors must assume that they will visit Bogotá and sites near three of CHS-2F's Regional coverage in the Departments of Antioquia; Bolívar; Boyacá; Caquetá; Cauca; Chocó; Huila; La Guajira; Magdalena; Meta; Nariño; Norte de Santander; Putumayo; Tolima; and Valle del Cauca.

**[END OF SECTION
C]**

ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND TEAM COMPOSITION

The final performance evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies including, a desk review of program documents and other secondary sources of information, personal in-depth interviews with key informants (KII), focus group discussions (FGD) with key stakeholders, and site visits to specific CHS-F2 intervention zones.

The team interviewed stakeholders that were, directly and indirectly, involved in the project between 2012 and 2015 as well as those with on-going knowledge or institutional responsibilities related to disengaged and vulnerable CH&A and the peace process. The team visited and spoke with counterparts and beneficiaries from two ICBF models for reintegration- institutional model and the community-based model with an indigenous community. The team was sensitive to the variables of urban, rural, ethnic communities and gender, and the unique conditions in the zones visited. The team evaluated the work of two GOC entities (known as “Observatories”) that were created to provide information and evidence to support government decision-making related to the protection of the rights and recruitment prevention. This evaluation took place through key informant interviews and an analysis of the program’s knowledge management written products.

In addition, conducting the evaluation 20 months after the project closed presented important limitations to gathering relevant information, as noted below.

The team employed a semi-structured interview approach, allowing some degree of deviation from the protocol. This allowed the interlocutor to have a partial role in determining the path of the conversation and facilitated a natural flow of conversation, which allowed follow up questions to focus on particularly useful topics that emerge during the interview.

ACTIVITY SITE VISITS

The team visited several zones where CHS-F2 activities took place from 2012 to 2015 and where there is a continuation of activities supported by the CHS-F2 program. Two-person teams visited Soacha, Cartagena and Villivencio, and a three-person team visited Cali and the Nasa/Toribio indigenous community Santander de Quilichao. The teams interviewed officials in mayor and governor’s offices, local ICBF staff, CSOs grantees, communities, and vulnerable CH&A and conducted focus group discussions. The team collected information to better understand different models of reintegration and CHS-F2 initiatives related to social inclusion and prevention of the recruitment and use of CH&A by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

The evaluation team conducted 6 focus group discussions (FGD) during the site visits with 50 project beneficiaries (8 individuals on average, 52% women and 48% men). These FGD included 1) religious leaders, staff, and disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, at a reintegration center in Cali; 2) community leaders and CH&A from the NASA indigenous community of Toribio in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca; 3) vulnerable boys, girls, and community leaders involved in prevention and social inclusion initiatives in Soacha, Cali, Cartagena, and Villavicencio.

These FGD allowed for exchange and discussion among direct beneficiaries of the activities supported by the IOM project in 2012-2015, which have continued to function in some form. The team employed

an open interview approach, which allowed for a more casual conversation appropriate for the setting and population. It allowed the young interlocutors and community leaders to determine the path of the conversation and allowed them to share sensitive personal information as they saw fit.

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

To facilitate the team's analysis of fieldwork interviews and focus groups, the team took notes in a Word format during the fieldwork. These notes aided the team to identify interviews and focus groups that provided the richest data and to guide the team's discussions on findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on the data.

TARGETED STAKEHOLDER SURVEY

(This section will be added once the targeted stakeholder survey is complete)

LIMITATIONS AND APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING BIAS

The CHS-F2 evaluation, like all evaluations, is subjected to several limitations. These include:

- 1. Ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation** - The fact that evaluation occurred some 20 months after the CH-F2 program ended presented several analytical challenges, including loss of institutional memory, deterioration of actual memory, and difficulty accessing reliable sources or personnel that worked on the project during the 2012-2015 time frame. The team does recognize that the ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation allowed for a more robust examination of sustainability. The team was able to evaluate how program effect had evolved over the 20 month period and gain a more nuanced understanding of how beneficiaries retained or did not retain benefits from program involvement. This understanding of sustainability allowed the team to provide more valuable recommendations for future programming than would otherwise have been possible.
- 2. Staff turnover and lack of institutional memory**— The high staff turnover in the GOC at the national, departmental and municipal levels and the lack of institutional memory presented challenges in accessing reliable information. Departmental and municipal elections were held in October 2015, two months before the CHS-F2 program ended, and brought in entirely new authorities with new priorities who were responsible for programs related to the CHS program. In addition, IOM has other USAID-funded programs in place. Some of these new actors and the presence of other programs caused some confusion among interviewees. This was less of a problem at the national level, as the Santos government was re-elected in 2014 and there were fewer turnovers of authorities. DI sought to minimize this limitation by consulting extensively with IOM and within government entities to identify as many members of the original CHS-F2 staff as possible.
- 3. Selection bias** – Although the team is unaware of informants who declined to participate in the evaluation, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those respondents who chose to participate might differ from those who did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions or socio-demographic characteristics and experience among other factors. In mitigation, the team made informants aware of the independence of the process and the confidentiality of responses.
- 4. Halo Bias** - There is a known tendency among respondents to underreport socially undesirable answers and to change their responses to fit with what they perceive as the social norm. The extent to which respondents will be prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some questions that call upon them to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on whom they depend for the provision of services or funding. To mitigate this limitation, the team provided the respondents with confidentiality and anonymity guarantees, conducted the meetings in private settings where respondents feel comfortable, and aimed to establish rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. For focus groups, the team held meetings in neutral locations and ensured that no grantee staff was present or able to overhear the proceedings.

5. Timeframe - The timeframe of this evaluation required a narrow, focused approach. The team was not able to generalize results across the entire population of beneficiaries reached by the project. Nevertheless, by using a mixed-methods approach and meeting with a diverse and purposively selected sample of beneficiaries, the team sought to mitigate the effects of this limitation.

The evaluation team consisted of three key experts: Team Leader, Ms. Kelly McBride, an international consultant with significant experience in issues of conflict resolution and GOC and USAID projects related to youth and conflict in Colombia and Central America; Dr. Marc Chernick, a senior conflict specialist who has studied the Colombian conflict, as well as other Latin American and international armed conflicts for over three decades, and is currently resident in Colombia on sabbatical from Georgetown University; and Mr. Hugo Navarro, a Colombian consultant with decades of international experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies and project design. In designing and implementing this evaluation, the Team has followed the guidelines outlined in USAID's Task Order accompanying the Scope of Work (Annex A). The team used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to gather data to investigate the evaluation questions, as described in more detail in the Evaluation Design and Methodology (Annex B).

The Team used four main data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), and an online survey. Information from these methods has been triangulated to ensure reliable findings, while discrepant observations and data have been noted and used as well.

TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Kelly McBride, Team Leader - The Team Leader is responsible for overall quality of the performance evaluation, including ensuring methodological rigor, testing and revising instruments and approaches as needed, and providing leadership, coordination, and supervision of team members, including for the document review, work plan, and design of the evaluation tools, as well as for meetings and key informant interviews, data analysis, debriefing to USAID, regular reporting during fieldwork, and draft and final report writing. The Team Leader will oversee interviews in Bogota and other fieldwork locations, working closely with the other team members. During fieldwork, the Team Leader will troubleshoot to address any problems that arise.

Marc Chernick, Senior Conflict Analyst – The Senior Conflict Analyst will provide technical leadership to ensure that the methodology includes the best current thinking on the conflict in Colombia, child soldiers, reintegration issues, and the changing circumstances brought on by the newly signed peace agreement. The Senior Conflict Analyst will ensure that the evaluation design, informant selection, data collection, analysis, and the report reflect a deep understanding of the subject matter and conflict dynamics in Colombia.

Hugo Navarro, Evaluation Specialist - The Evaluation Specialist will support the Team Leader in the design and implementation of high-quality methodological approaches, participate in data collection and analysis activities, and ensure that all tools and reports meet DI's high standards for methodological rigor. He will assist the Team Leader in overall evaluation management, including by conducting background research, assisting with the development of the work plan, instrument design, and evaluation methodology, and participating in fieldwork. He will provide support to tailor the data collection instruments and to inform subsequent analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. He will work with the Team Leader to draft and edit the evaluation report and present key findings and recommendations.

Local Conflict Specialist – The Local Conflict Specialist will support the evaluation team in understanding the local conflict dynamics and conflict drivers in Colombia. He or she will provide nuanced local context to inform development of all deliverables, development of data collection protocols and design, and participate as needed in data collection. He or she will provide support to tailor the data collection instruments and to inform subsequent analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. He or she will work

with the Team Leader to draft and edit the evaluation report and present key findings and recommendations as needed.

Administrative/Logistical Coordinator - DI will hire an administrative/logistical coordinator in a non-key personnel capacity to work with the Team Leader to plan logistics for data collection, make appointments with interviewees, and manage local travel arrangements for the team. The Coordinator will arrange travel for all team members to conduct data collection in Bogota and selected fieldwork locations. The coordinator will also assist in the scheduling process for interviews, focus groups, and field site visits.

Home Office Support Staff - Drawing upon its experience successfully managing evaluations around the world, DI's home office Analytical Services team, led by **DI's Director of Analytical Services** Dr. Yemile Mizrahi, will oversee the entire task order and will be primarily responsible for the timely production of high-quality deliverables, seamless implementation of fieldwork, and the maintenance of a positive and productive working relationship with all stakeholders. **Program Officer** Michael Cowan will provide administrative and logistical support to this evaluation, serve as the main point of contact between USAID and DI from DI's Home Office, and manage day-to-day operations of the evaluation team. DI's **Senior Evaluation and Survey Specialist** Dr. Aaron Abbarno will provide expert evaluation technical support and support the survey design and analysis in coordination with the evaluation team.

DI's management approach includes clear lines of authority to enable timely communication between the evaluation team, USAID, and DI. The Team Leader represents DI in the field and oversees the rest of the evaluation team. The Team Leader reports to Dr. Mizrahi in DI's home office and to USAID in Colombia. All other team members working in the field report directly to the Team Leader.

ANNEX C: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP GUIDES

INSTRUMENTOS DE RECOLECCIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN <i>Mayo 21 2017</i>	Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
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Este documento contiene los instrumentos de recolección de información de la evaluación, y se estructura en tres secciones: i) guías de entrevistas individuales; ii) guías de grupos focales y iii) encuesta institucional.

1. Guías de entrevistas individuales

Este documento contiene cuatro guías para entrevistas individuales con grupos de interés del programa CHS-2F. Las guías son dirigidas a los siguientes grupos:

- Funcionarios de OIM (**página 3**)
- Entidades del gobierno (**página 4**)
- ONG que participan como operadores (**página 5**)
- Entidades bilaterales y multilaterales (**página 6**)

Las guías están organizadas por bloques de preguntas que guardan coherencia temática, iniciando con preguntas generales y luego con preguntas sobre temáticas puntuales. Para cada pregunta se establece su relación con las cinco preguntas de evaluación de los términos de referencia y además se proponen algunos temas de profundización que pueden orientar las contra-preguntas.

Se sugiere seguir el siguiente texto para introducir la evaluación antes de aplicar las preguntas de los guías de entrevistas.

Democracy International es una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar una evaluación independiente de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual es coordinado desde Oficina de Poblaciones Vulnerables e implementado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM).

En el desarrollo de la evaluación, el equipo de Democracy International está realizando entrevistas individuales y grupos focales con funcionarios del gobierno nacional y local, de las ONG que participan como operadores, y de entidades bilaterales y multilaterales.

El propósito de esta entrevista es conocer su experiencia y percepciones generales sobre este tipo de programas que buscan complementar la oferta institucional para la prevención y atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento.

La entrevista tiene una duración aproximada de una hora y queremos solicitar su autorización para grabarla. El propósito de la grabación no es otro que facilitar la toma de notas durante la entrevista.

2. Guías de grupos focales

Este documento contiene dos guías para grupos focales para las siguientes poblaciones:

- *Personal de los equipos técnicos de operadores (página 7):* Participan 8 profesionales (psicólogos, médicos, docentes, etc) que prestan atención especializada a los NNA desmovilizados de los GAI.
- *Jóvenes egresados del ICBF (página 8):* Participan 8 jóvenes egresados del Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF.

Las guías están organizadas por bloques de preguntas que guardan coherencia temática, iniciando con preguntas generales y luego con preguntas sobre temáticas puntuales. En el caso del grupo focal con profesionales de los equipos técnicos de los operados se incluyó una sección especial sobre capacidades técnicas que sigue un formato de “taller” y está basada en el enfoque apreciativo². Cada grupo focal tiene una duración de 2 horas y 15 minutos.

La Presentación del estudio se realiza con el mismo texto que se usa en las guías de entrevista individuales.

Se sugiere establecer normas para el desarrollo de los grupos focales y leerlas a los participantes. Las normas sugeridas para tener una conversación interesante y fluida, los invitamos a:

- P
- Compartir sus experiencias y opiniones sobre los temas que vamos a abordar. Todas sus opiniones son importantes para mejorar el apoyo que brinda el Programa
- Escuchar atentamente las opiniones de sus compañeros de mesa, porque esta conversación también es una oportunidad para aprender de los demás.
- Respetar las opiniones de los demás, en esta conversación no hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas, y podemos decir si estamos de acuerdo o no con las opiniones de los demás.
- Ser concretos cuando hablamos, para permitir que otros puedan compartir sus experiencias. Vamos a manejar turnos de dos o tres minutos.
- Apagar o silenciar los teléfonos celulares.

3. Encuesta de capacidad institucional

Se elaboraron dos versiones de la encuesta, una para evaluar la capacitación institucional de la Ruta de Atención (página 8) y la otra centrada en las Rutas de Prevención (página Error! Bookmark not defined.).

La encuesta comprende 12 preguntas. Las preguntas iniciales están relacionadas con el conocimiento del encuestado de las rutas y el trabajo que realiza su entidad. Luego se pregunta por los resultados alcanzados con el desarrollo de las rutas. Posteriormente, se realizan preguntas sobre los desafíos de capacidad institucional, tomando como referente la metodología Sistema de Análisis de Capacidad Institucional (SADCI) del Banco Mundial. A continuación se pregunta por el desempeño de las diferentes entidades del ámbito municipal, departamental y nacional que participan en las rutas. La encuesta finaliza con preguntas acerca de la contribución del CHS-2F.

² Este enfoque se toma de www.betterevaluation.com.

La encuesta se aplicará de manera virtual utilizando Formularios de Google. La lista de personas que responderán la encuesta será proporcionada por CIPRUNNA y la OIM. El diligenciamiento de la encuesta toma menos de 15 minutos.

GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A FUNCIONARIOS DE LA OIM

Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad en la entidad y datos de contacto.

Preguntas para iniciar		
¿Cuál fue el rol o responsabilidades de su equipo/dependencia/oficina en relación el programa CHS-2F?		
Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué actividades realizó usted relacionadas con el programa CHS-2F?		
¿Actualmente qué rol o responsabilidad tiene su equipo/dependencia/oficina en relación con la política de prevención del reclutamiento y atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?		
Preguntas de profundización		
PE	Preguntas entrevista	Aspectos a focalizar
1	Para la implementación del programa CHS-2F entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué cambios incorporó la OIM en su forma de trabajo y relacionamiento con las entidades del gobierno colombiano, en comparación con las fases anteriores del Programa?	Buenas prácticas Lecciones aprendidas
1	¿Cuáles son los principales retos que enfrentó la OIM para implementar la segunda fase (2012 -2015) del Programa con las entidades del gobierno colombiano?	Buenas prácticas Lecciones aprendidas
2,4	¿En qué aspectos la asistencia técnica de la OIM entre el 2012 y 2015 permitió que los niños, niñas y adolescentes, familias y comunidades accedieran a una mejor oferta institucional para: a. la prevención del reclutamiento de NNA? b. la atención a NNA desvinculados?	-Modalidades -Enfoques -Transferencia de metodologías
4	¿Cuáles fueron las alianzas más estratégicas para la OIM en la implementación del programa CHS-2F? ¿Cuáles fueron los resultados más relevantes generados por estas alianzas?	- Diferenciar por áreas de intervención
3,4	De los resultados esperados de las políticas de prevención y/o atención , en el periodo 2012 -2015, ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?	Derechos Grupos poblacionales
4	Durante la implementación de la segunda fase, ¿Qué tipo de resultados no esperados o no previstos por la OIM ocurrieron?	Resultados no esperados positivos y negativos
4,5	¿En qué medida las entidades del gobierno colombiano a nivel nacional y territorial se han apropiado de los enfoques, metodologías y herramientas generados con el acompañamiento del CHS-2F? ¿Este nivel de apropiación garantiza la sostenibilidad de los resultados en ausencia de la asistencia técnica de la OIM?	Áreas estratégicas Transferencia de metodologías
5	El programa CHS-2F se implementó durante el desarrollo de los diálogos de paz con las FARC: a. ¿Cuál fue la incidencia del proceso de paz en la operación del programa CHS-2F? b. ¿Qué incidencia ha tenido el acuerdo final de paz dentro del desarrollo de las políticas de prevención y/o atención .	Contextualización el Programa
Preguntas de cierre		

5	En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los recursos de la cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar fortaleciendo los resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?	Áreas estratégicas
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GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA CON ENTIDADES DEL GOBIERNO (NACIONALES Y TERRITORIALES) QUE RECIBIERON APOYO DE CHS-2F

Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad en la entidad y datos de contacto.

Preguntas para iniciar		
¿Cuál es el rol o responsabilidades de su <i>dependencia</i> ³ en relación con la prevención del reclutamiento y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?		
En los últimos cinco años, ¿Con qué propósitos y de qué manera se relacionó esta <i>dependencia</i> con USAID/OIM?		
PE	Preguntas de profundización	Temas
1	Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué actividades realizó usted relacionadas con la prevención del reclutamiento y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?	Experiencia en el programa
1,4	Entre 2012 y 2015 ¿Qué tipo de cambios internos implementó su <i>dependencia</i> para responder a los objetivos y enfoques de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?	-Modalidades - Enfoques
1,4	¿En qué medida el programa CHS-2F apoyó o contribuyó a estos cambios? ¿Cuáles fueron las actividades del programa CHS-2F que generaron mayores transformaciones en su <i>dependencia</i> ? ¿Cuáles actividades tuvieron menor incidencia?	Buenas prácticas y lecciones aprendidas
1,4	¿Cuáles enfoques, metodologías o herramientas apoyadas por el programa CHS-2F están siendo utilizadas por su <i>dependencia</i> ?	Transferencia de metodologías
3	En los programas de prevención y/o atención de su <i>dependencia</i> , ¿Cómo se incorpora el enfoque diferencial? ¿En qué le aportó el CHS-2F en este aspecto? ¿Con cuáles poblaciones tienen los mayores desafíos?	Edad, género, etnia
1,4	Durante este período, ¿En qué medida el programa CHS-2F contribuyó a mejorar la coordinación interinstitucional de su <i>dependencia</i> ?	Mecanismos
4	Para el desarrollo de las acciones de esta <i>dependencia</i> , ¿En qué medida y para qué propósitos utiliza la información que proveen los observatorios del ICBF y de CIPRUNNA? En su concepto, ¿cuál fue el aporte del programa CHS-2F para el desarrollo de esos observatorios?	Gestión de conocimiento
5	¿Cuál ha sido la incidencia del proceso de paz y el acuerdo final paz en la operación de los programas su <i>dependencia</i> en temas de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?	Contextualización del programa
3,4	De los resultados esperados de las políticas de prevención y/o atención , en el período 2012 -2015, ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?	Derechos Poblaciones
Preguntas de cierre		
	¿Cuáles son las áreas en las que su <i>dependencia</i> requiere mayor fortalecimiento	-Modalidades

³ “Dependencia se utilizará como sinónimo de oficina, área o equipo en el que trabaja el entrevistado.

3,4,5	para hacer una mayor contribución a la prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?	-Enfoques - Metodologías - Recursos
5	En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los recursos de la cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar fortaleciendo los resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?	Áreas estratégicas

GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A FUNCIONARIOS DE OPERADORES (ONG)

Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad en la entidad y datos de contacto.

Preguntas para iniciar		
¿Cómo ha sido la participación de esta entidad con relación a la política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o la atención de NNA víctimas de este delito?		
Entre 2012 y 2015, en el marco del programa CHS-2F, ¿Con qué propósitos y de qué manera se relacionó esta entidad con la OIM? Describa brevemente la asistencia técnica que recibió esta entidad por parte de la OIM durante este periodo.		
PE	Preguntas de profundización	Temas
1	¿Cuál es la oferta de servicios para la prevención y/o atención que reciben los NNA que atiende esta entidad?	Modalidades Enfoques
2,4	En los últimos cinco años, ¿Qué tipo de ajustes han tenido los servicios que ustedes ofrecen directamente a los NNA y cómo incidieron en la garantía de los derechos e integración social de los NNA?	Modalidades y enfoques
3	En la atención que reciben los NNA en su institución, ¿Cómo se incorpora el enfoque diferencial? ¿En qué le aportó el CHS-2F en este aspecto? ¿Con cuáles poblaciones tienen los mayores desafíos?	Edad, género y etnia
1,4	¿Cuáles enfoques, metodologías o herramientas apoyadas por el programa CHS-2F están siendo utilizadas por su entidad?	Transferencia de metodologías
2	¿Cómo valora usted los servicios que reciben los niños de su institución a través otras entidades públicas y privadas del territorio?	Modalidades
2,5	¿Cuáles han sido las alianzas más estratégicas para su entidad en la atención a NNA? ¿Cuáles han sido los resultados más relevantes generados por estas alianzas? ¿Con cuáles actores del territorio que considere estratégicos no han logrado trabajar como aliados?	Áreas de intervención
2,4	¿Cómo promueve su entidad la participación de los NNA, familias y comunidad? ¿Qué beneficios y retos tiene la participación de estos actores?	Mecanismos Instancias
4	¿De qué manera su entidad verifica los avances hacia la garantía de los derechos y la integración social de los NNA que atiende?	Gestión de conocimiento
4	¿En qué medida en este territorio se divulgan los resultados y se sistematizan las experiencias de la política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de ese delito?	Gestión de conocimiento
4	En los NNA que han sido atendidos por su entidad, ¿Cuáles han sido los resultados en relación con la reunificación familiar y la integración social?	Diferencias por género y etnia
2	En su concepto, ¿Cuál fue el aporte del programa CHS-2F a esos resultados? ¿Cuáles fueron los factores que incidieron positiva y negativamente para el logro de esos resultados?	Lecciones aprendidas
Preguntas de cierre		
5	En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los recursos de la cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar fortaleciendo los resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes	Areas estratégicas

	víctimas de este delito?	
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GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A DONANTES BILATERALES Y MULTILATERALES

Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad en la entidad y datos de contacto.


PE	Preguntas para iniciar	Temas
1,5	¿Cuáles han sido los principales objetivos y metas de esta entidad en relación con la política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o la atención de NNA víctimas de este delito?	Áreas estratégicas
5	Durante este período, ¿Cuáles fueron los principales apoyos que su entidad brindó a las entidades que participan en las políticas de prevención y/o atención en riesgo o víctimas del reclutamiento? ¿En qué áreas?	
5	Cuál ha sido la incidencia del proceso de paz y el acuerdo final paz en el apoyo de su entidad a las políticas de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?	Contextualización
PE	Preguntas de profundización	Temas
2	Durante el período 2012 y 2015 ¿Cómo valora la coordinación entre las distintas entidades de cooperación que apoyaron la política de prevención del reclutamiento y la atención de NNA víctimas de este delito?	Planeación Información coordinación
2	¿Qué estrategias implementaron para evitar duplicaciones y lograr complementariedad entre las diferentes iniciativas?	
2	En relación con el programa CHS-2F, ¿cómo se dio esta coordinación?	
4	¿Cuáles son los principales beneficios que se generaron a partir de esta colaboración con el programa CHS-2F?	Diferentes tipos de beneficios
2	¿Cuáles son las principales lecciones aprendidas de esta colaboración?	Metodologías, herramientas
3,4	De los resultados esperados de la política de prevención , en el período 2012 -2015, ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?	Derechos Grupos poblacionales
3,4	De los resultados esperados de la política de atención en el período 2012-2015 ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?	Derechos Grupos poblacionales
1	En su concepto, ¿Cuáles fueron otros factores que incidieron positiva y negativamente para el logro de esos resultados?	Factores de riesgo
3	Actualmente, en las rutas de prevención y/o atención , ¿cuáles son las principales barreras para la garantía de derechos e integración social de los niños, niñas y adolescentes?	Diferencias por género y etnia
PE	Preguntas de cierre	Temas
5	Con la desmovilización de las FARC, ¿Qué retos surgen para el país y la cooperación internacional en relación con la prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes?	Áreas estratégicas
5	Para los próximos cinco años, ¿Cuáles son las prioridades de su entidad en relación con la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?	Áreas estratégicas

GUÍA DE GRUPOS FOCALES CON EL EQUIPO TÉCNICO DE LOS OPERADORES

Preguntas para iniciar (15 minutos)
¿Cuénteme por favor sus nombres y a qué se dedican?
¿Hace cuánto viven o trabajan en este municipio?
¿Qué es lo que más les gusta de este municipio?
Exposición al programa (20 minutos)
¿Cuénteme si conocen el programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)?
¿En cuáles actividades de este programa han ustedes participado? ¿En qué medida estas actividades han sido útiles para desempeñar mejor su trabajo?
Preguntas sobre la ruta de atención (40 minutos)
¿Cómo describe las condiciones de los NNA en el momento de desvinculación de los GAIL?
Durante el proceso de atención, ¿Cuáles actitudes y comportamientos de los NNA son para ustedes los mejores de indicadores de que están avanzando en la atención? ¿Qué tan frecuente observa estos indicadores?
Durante el proceso de atención, ¿Cuáles actitudes y comportamientos de los NNA son para ustedes los mejores de indicadores de que NO están avanzando en la atención? ¿Qué tan frecuente observa estos indicadores?
Al terminar la atención, ¿Cuáles son las principales expectativas y objetivos de los NNA?
En su opinión, ¿Cuáles son las principales fortalezas que tienen los NNA para alcanzar estos objetivos y cuáles son los principales desafíos que enfrentan?
ACTIVIDAD OPCIONAL: Diálogo sobre capacidades técnicas (60 minutos)
<i>Cada uno(a) piense en una situación muy específica que haya sucedido en los últimos tres meses en el “Centro de Atención” en el que trabaja, en la que considere que se evidenció un trabajo planeado, ejecutado y ajustado con seguimiento y rigor.</i>
<i>Actividad 1 (30 minutos)</i>
Organicémonos ahora por parejas y cuéntale a tu compañero sobre esa situación lo siguiente: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ¿De qué se trata la experiencia en la que estás pensando? Descríbela. • ¿Qué hizo posible que las cosas se dieran de ese modo? ¿Qué asuntos pasaron de modo distinto? • ¿De qué manera contribuiste tú directamente a que se diera el trabajo de esta forma? • ¿Qué opiniones o consideraciones tienes ahora cuando piensas en esa experiencia? Primero una de las personas de la pareja pregunta y, mientras el otro contesta, tomar apuntes y hace todo lo posible para comprender bien la experiencia que narra su compañero o compañera. Después, intercambian los roles
<i>Actividad 2 (30 minutos)</i>
Vamos ahora a reunirnos todos. La idea es que revisemos nuestras experiencias de trabajo planeado y sistemático e identifiquemos qué asuntos en común tienen ellas. El compartir lo vamos a hacer de la siguiente manera: cada persona va a contar brevemente cuál fue la experiencia de su compañero o compañera y, además de referirse a los puntos principales que les señalaron, va a decir qué fue lo que personalmente más le tocó al escuchar la experiencia.

GUÍA DE GRUPOS FOCAL CON EGRESADOS DEL PROGRAMA ESPECIALIZADO DEL ICBF

Preguntas para iniciar
¿Cuénteme por favor sus nombres?
¿Hace cuánto viven en este municipio?
¿Qué es lo que más les gusta de este municipio?
Si tuvieran la oportunidad, ¿Qué le cambiarían a este municipio?
Preguntas de profundización
¿Cuáles fueron los mejores momentos y las mejores experiencias durante su permanencia en el Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
En las situaciones y circunstancias más difíciles durante su proceso en el Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF, ¿cuáles apoyos fueron fundamentales para seguir adelante?
¿Cómo fue el proceso de terminación de su participación en el Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
¿Cuáles fueron sus expectativas y metas al salir del Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
Actualmente, ¿Cuáles son los principales retos para avanzar y alcanzar estas metas?
Preguntas de cierre
¿Qué cambios le harían al Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
Si todo fuera posible y existieran los recursos, ¿Qué harían para que en este municipio jóvenes como ustedes mejoren sus condiciones de vida?

Cliente: USAID		Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
ENCUESTA DE CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL PARA LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA ATENCIÓN DE NIÑOS, NIÑAS Y ADOLESCENTES DESVINCULADOS Y LA PREVENCIÓN DEL RECLUTAMIENTO, LA UTILIZACIÓN Y LA VIOLENCIA SEXUAL POR PARTE DE GRUPOS ARMADOS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY		
<p>Saludo al Informante. Muy buenos días/ tardes/ noches (Dr.) / (Dra.) (nombre del informante de la base). Mi nombre es (nombre y apellido), Hago parte de Democracy International, una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar una evaluación independiente de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual es coordinados desde la Oficina de Poblaciones Vulnerables de USAID e implementado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). USAID nos ha solicitado aplicarle esta encuesta con el propósito de enriquecer las conclusiones y recomendaciones de esta evaluación.</p> <p>Es muy importante que usted sepa que esta encuesta NO es ni una auditoría ni una evaluación de desempeño de su entidad. Por lo anterior, sus opiniones sinceras contribuirán a los resultados y recomendaciones. Su identidad, así como las respuestas suministradas serán de carácter confidencial y los datos se utilizarán únicamente para fines estadísticos. Le agradecería que dedicara 15 minutos para responder unas preguntas. ¿Puedo comenzar?</p>		

1	Fecha	dd/mm/año
2	Nombre	
3	Sexo	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Hombre 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Mujer
4	Cargo	
5	Entidad	
6	Municipio	
7	Departamento	
8	En su entidad usted trabaja principalmente en:	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual de niños, niñas y adolescentes por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (responda la Sección I, preguntas de la 9 a la 20) 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes desvinculados de grupos al margen de la ley (responda la Sección II, preguntas de la 21 a la 32) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Ninguna de las anteriores (fin de la encuesta)

Sección I. Prevención

9	<p>¿Conoce usted las siguientes rutas de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual de niños, niñas y adolescentes por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley?</p> <p>a. La Ruta de Prevención Temprana Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>b. La Ruta de Prevención Urgente Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>c. La Ruta de Prevención En prevención Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p>																																																															
10	<p>La entidad en que usted trabaja, ¿En cuáles de las siguientes rutas de prevención participa o tiene responsabilidades?</p> <p>a. La Ruta de Prevención Temprana Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>b. La Ruta de Prevención Urgente Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>c. La Ruta de Prevención en Prevención Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p>																																																															
11	<p>En su opinión, en los últimos 5 años, las Rutas de Prevención han logrado los resultados esperados de manera:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Sobresaliente 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactoria 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Moderada 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Insuficiente 5 <input type="checkbox"/> No ha logrado los resultados esperados</p>																																																															
12	<p>Ordene las tres rutas de prevención de acuerdo con su efectividad para lograr los resultados esperados, señalando con 3 la ruta con mejores resultados y con 1 la ruta con menores resultados</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> La Ruta de Prevención Temprana <input type="checkbox"/> La Ruta de Prevención Urgente <input type="checkbox"/> La Ruta de Prevención en Prevención</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR</p>																																																														
13	<p>En los últimos 5 años, ¿En qué medida los siguientes tipos de problemas, para los cuales a continuación se dan algunos ejemplos, han limitado la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que participan en las Rutas de Prevención?</p> <p>Marcando con 1 cuando el problema ha tenido ninguna o poca incidencia y 5 la mayor incidencia</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2" style="width: 65%;">Tipos de problemas</th><th colspan="6">marque con un ✕</th></tr> <tr> <th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>NS/ NR</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left; padding: 5px;">g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.</td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td><td><input type="checkbox"/></td></tr> </tbody> </table>		Tipos de problemas	marque con un ✕						1	2	3	4	5	NS/ NR	a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tipos de problemas	marque con un ✕																																																															
	1	2	3	4	5	NS/ NR																																																										
a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										
g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																										

14	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo han cambiado los problemas que afectan la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que participan en la Ruta de Prevención? Marcando 1= Empeorado; 2=Permanece igual; 3=Mejorado.										
	Tipos de problemas					marque con una ✕					
						1	2	3	NS/ NR		
	a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional – inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
15	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito departamental y municipal , en la implementación de las Rutas de Prevención? Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño										
	Lista de entidades					marque con una ✕					
						1	2	3	4	5	NS/NR
	Gobernaciones					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Alcaldías					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Personerías Municipales					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Defensorías de Familia					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inspecciones de Policía					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Comisarias de Familia					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones regionales del ICBF					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Defensorías regionales					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Procuradurías regionales y provinciales					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones territoriales de la UARIV					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones regionales del SENA					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Organizaciones de la sociedad civil con acciones a nivel local					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Organizaciones de cooperación internacional con acciones a nivel local					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Empresas privadas con acciones a nivel local					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<p>En general, en los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito nacional, en la implementación de las Rutas de Prevención? Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño</p>		<p>marque con una ✖</p>											
<p>Lista de entidades</p>		1	2	3	4	5	NS/NR						
16	Comisión Intersectorial para la prevención de reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes por parte de grupos organizados al margen de la ley - CIPRUNNA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio para el Postconflicto, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Consejería Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Defensa Nacional	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio del Trabajo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Educación Nacional	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Ministerio de Cultura	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (DPS)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Unidad para la Atención Integral y Reparación a las Víctimas (UARIV)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Agencia Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema (ANSPE)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Dirección Nacional de Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Dirección del Sistema Nacional de Juventud "Colombia Joven"	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Departamento Administrativo del Deporte, la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (COLDEPORTES)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Defensoría del Pueblo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
	Procuraduría General de la Nación	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>						
17	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que influyó la cooperación internacional en el fortalecimiento de las Rutas de Prevención?	<p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo algo de influencia 4 <input type="checkbox"/> No tuvo ninguna influencia 5 <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR</p>											
18	¿Conoce usted la segunda fase del programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), implementada entre los años 2012 y 2015?	<p>Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/></p>											
19	Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que influyó el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) en el fortalecimiento de las Rutas de Prevención?	<p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo algo de influencia 4 <input type="checkbox"/> No tuvo ninguna influencia 5 <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR</p>											
	Si en la pregunta anterior respondió 1 ("Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva"), enumere los tres principales temas en que el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) tuvo una influencia decisiva:												

20	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____
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Sección I. Atención

21	¿Conoce usted la Ruta de Atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes desvinculados por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley, cuyo eje principal es el Programa de Atención Especializada desarrollado por el ICBF?	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
22	La entidad en que usted trabaja, ¿En cuáles de las modalidades del Programa de Atención Especializada participa o tiene responsabilidades?	
	a. Modalidad institucional (Hogares Transitorios, Centros de Atención Especializada (CAE) y Casa Juveniles)	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Modalidad socio-familiar (Hogares Gestores y Hogares Tutores)	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Modalidad comunitaria	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
23	En su opinión, en los últimos 5 años, la Ruta de Atención ha logrado los resultados esperados de manera:	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Sobresaliente 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactoria 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Moderada 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Insuficiente 5 <input type="checkbox"/> No ha logrado los resultados esperados
24	Ordene las tres modalidades de atención de acuerdo con su efectividad para lograr los resultados esperados, señalando con 3 la modalidad con mejores resultados y con 1 la modalidad con menores resultados	<input type="checkbox"/> Modalidad institucional <input type="checkbox"/> Modalidad socio-familiar <input type="checkbox"/> Modalidad comunitaria <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR
25	En los últimos 5 años, ¿En qué medida los siguientes tipos de problemas, para los cuales a continuación se dan algunos ejemplos, han limitado la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que participan en la Ruta de Atención? Marcando con 1 cuando el problema ha tenido ninguna o poca incidencia y 5 la mayor incidencia	
	Tipos de problemas	marque con un ✖ 1 2 3 4 5 NS/NR
	a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional, y/o suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	h. Entidades sin estrategias o con estrategias insuficientes o metodologías inadecuadas	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>


	para promover o brindar atención con enfoque diferencial (ciclo vital, género, grupo étnico y condición de discapacidad)					
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26	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo han cambiado los problemas que afectan la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que participan en la Ruta de Atención? Marcando 1= Empeorado; 2=Permanece igual; 3=Mejorado .						
	Tipos de problemas				marque con una ✕		
		1	2	3	NS/ NR		
	a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada entidad, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y/o suministro irregular de información y servicios entre entidades, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura organizacional – inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos adquiridos, entre otros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de tareas de las entidades	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
h. Entidades sin estrategias o con estrategias insuficientes o metodologías inadecuadas para promover o brindar atención con enfoque diferencial (ciclo vital, género, grupo étnico y condición de discapacidad).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
27	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito departamental y municipal , en la implementación de la Ruta de Atención? Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño						
	Lista de entidades				marque con una ✕		
		1	2	3	4	5	NS/NR
	Gobernaciones	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Alcaldías	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Personerías Municipales	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Defensorías de Familia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inspecciones de Policía	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Comisarías de Familia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones regionales del ICBF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Defensorías regionales	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Procuradurías regionales y provinciales	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones territoriales de la UARIV	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Direcciones regionales del SENA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Organizaciones de la sociedad civil con acciones a nivel local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Organizaciones de cooperación internacional con acciones a nivel local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Empresas privadas con acciones a nivel local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

28	En general, en los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito nacional , en la implementación de la Ruta de Atención? Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño						
	Lista de entidades		marque con una ✕				
		1	2	3	4	5	NS/NR
	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República – DAPRE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Vicepresidencia de la República	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio para el Postconflicto, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Defensa Nacional	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio del Trabajo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Educación Nacional	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Cultura	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Ministerio de Transporte	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (DPS)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Unidad para la Atención Integral y Reparación a las Víctimas (UARIV)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Agencia Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema (ANSPE)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Departamento Administrativo del Deporte, la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (COLDEPORTES)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Fiscalía General de la Nación	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Defensoría del Pueblo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Procuraduría General de la Nación	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
29	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que influyó la cooperación internacional en el fortalecimiento de la Ruta de Atención?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo algo de influencia 4 <input type="checkbox"/> No tuvo ninguna influencia 5 <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR					
30	¿Conoce usted la segunda fase del programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), implementada entre los años 2012 y 2015?	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>					
31	Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que influyó el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) en el fortalecimiento de la Ruta de Atención?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo algo de influencia 4 <input type="checkbox"/> No tuvo ninguna influencia 5 <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR					
Si en la pregunta anterior respondió 1 ("Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva"), enumere los tres							

32	principales temas en que el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) tuvo una influencia decisiva:	
	1.	_____
	2.	_____
	3.	_____

DRAFT SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Cliente: USAID		Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y prevención del reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
<p><i>Democracy International, una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar una evaluación independiente de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y prevención del reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual es coordinados desde la Oficina de Poblaciones Vulnerables de USAID e implementado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). USAID nos ha solicitado aplicarle esta encuesta con el propósito de enriquecer las conclusiones y recomendaciones de esta evaluación.</i></p> <p><i>Es muy importante que usted sepa que esta encuesta NO es ni una auditoría ni una evaluación de desempeño de su entidad. Por lo anterior, sus opiniones sinceras contribuirán a los resultados y recomendaciones. Su identidad, así como las respuestas suministradas serán de carácter confidencial y los datos se utilizarán únicamente para fines estadísticos. Le agradecemos que tome 15 minutos de su tiempo para responder unas preguntas sobre la contribución del programa de USAID/OIM a la política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA.</i></p>		
1	Fecha	dd/mm/año
2	Nombre	
3	Sexo	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Hombre 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Mujer
4	Cargo	
5	Entidad	
6	Municipio	
7	Departamento	
8	Conoce usted del apoyo que la Organización Internacional de Migraciones (OIM), con recursos de USAID, ha brindado al Gobierno de Colombia para fortalecer la política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) por parte de grupos armados organizados al margen de la ley.	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/> → Fin de la encuesta

9	En los últimos 5 años, ¿su entidad o entidades con las que trabajan en coordinación han recibido apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, para el fortalecimiento de las acciones de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización NNA?	Si 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/> → Fin de la encuesta
10	¿Con cuáles entidades coordina su entidad las acciones de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA? Enumere las 5 principales entidades.	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____ 5. _____
11	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto ha influido el apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, en el fortalecimiento de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Tuvo algo de influencia 4 <input type="checkbox"/> No tuvo ninguna influencia 5 <input type="checkbox"/> NS/NR

12	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales FORTALEZAS del apoyo que OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
	4. _____ 5. _____ 6. _____
13	En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales DEBILIDADES del apoyo que OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____
14	En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es la menor contribución y 10 la mayor contribución, ¿Qué tanto ha contribuido el apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, al fortalecimiento de la capacidad institucional de su entidad (o de las entidades con que trabaja en coordinación) para cumplir con los objetivos de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA? <div style="text-align: center;"> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 <input type="checkbox"/> 8 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/> 10 <input type="checkbox"/> </div>
	En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es la menor contribución y 10 la mayor contribución, ¿Qué tanto ha contribuido el apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, al fortalecimiento de la gestión de

15	<p>conocimiento de su entidad (o de las entidades con que trabaja en coordinación) para cumplir con los objetivos de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 <input type="checkbox"/> 8 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/> 10 <input type="checkbox"/></p>
16	<p>¿Cómo se debe reorientar la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA en el contexto de implementación de los acuerdos de paz con las FARC?</p>
	<p>1. _____</p> <p>2. _____</p> <p>3. _____</p>
17	<p>¿Cuáles son las tres principales áreas estratégicas en las cuales la comunidad internacional, especialmente USAID, debería continuar apoyando al Gobierno de Colombia para prevenir el reclutamiento y utilización de NNA en los próximos 5 años?</p>
	<p>1. _____</p> <p>2. _____</p> <p>3. _____</p>

ANNEX D: TABLE OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Research Question	Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
To what extent has the CHS-2F supported the GOC policies and programs to reintegrate child soldiers?	<p>CHS-2F has supported the systemization of knowledge of the ICBF to develop policies and methodologies at the national level and help transfer and adapt them to the local (territorial) level. The CHS program worked to strengthen two other models: institutional protection models with residential program run by operators in Medellin, Cali and Rio Sucio, Caldas, and the foster care model that was originally developed in 6 regional capitals (Pasto, Villavicencio, Bogotá, Medellin, Manizales, Barranquilla) where families and specifically women (<i>foster mothers/madres tutoras</i>) were specially trained to care for disengaged CH&A. It also worked to provide ICBF assistance, particularly psychosocial, life-preparation counseling and other support services to children who were able to their families.</p> <p>The program worked to include disengaged CH&A in the development and implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law (June 2011.)</p> <p>During the final extension of CHF-F2 and in response to the peace negotiations, the program supported ICBF to develop contingency plans in</p>	<p>ICBF's contingency plans for managing a large-scale disengagement of FARC CH&A were ultimately not activated. Only 87 CH&A from the FARC ranks were released and the Presidential Counsellor for Human Rights, rather than ICBF, is managing the immediate reception of the FARC CH&A.</p> <p>The family reunification and family ties program by ICBF is lauded by ICBF officials as a successful and necessary model to help disengaged CH&A reconnect and repair relations with their families. ICBF is still using a protocol developed with IOM support to organize the family reunification activity. Unfortunately, the family meetings are now sporadic due to lack of ICBF funds for the activity.</p> <p>The residential and foster care models have developed successful programs that with some exceptions have successfully met the goals of disengaging CH&A from the armed conflict, providing them with psychological services,</p>	<p>Support the implementation of the updated GOC policy guidance (Conpes) on the prevention of recruitment and use, soon to be released by the Colombian Directorate of National Planning.</p> <p>Engage in a policy dialogue with officials from Colombia's state and government institutions and the presidential candidates on youth issues.</p>

	the event of large-scale disengagement of CH&A from the FARC ranks.	providing access to primary and secondary education, and transferring them into skills and technical development programs through SENA and ACR (now ARN) when they turn 18 years old.	
What are the strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned of the institutional reintegration and alternative models for each one of the models supported by CHS-F2?	<p>On the outset, the program anticipated support for different models developed around ethnicity as well as rural and urban environments. It also planned to develop a differentiated approach to gender. However, we found little evidence that these approaches or concerns were integrated into the ICBF model.</p> <p>The most significant advancement that we saw was based on a pilot program that IOM developed in Toribio, Cauca. There IOM worked with a Nasa indigenous community on an eco-tourism project designed to reincorporate young people who had joined one of the illegal armed groups as well as to prevent recruitment and provide skills and alternative work options for the young and for the community as a whole.</p> <p>The team found little evidence that gender-based approaches had been incorporated into the CHS program in an integral or crosscutting fashion.</p> <p>Regarding differential treatment for ethnic groups, ICBF pointed to a residential program for disengaged youths, the Ingruma Integration Center, in Rio</p>	<p>Data is incomplete for children returning to their own families. Returning children and adolescents to their families is represented as humane, however, this option is also where the state is least able to provide assistance, security, education, or psychosocial accompaniment. There needs to be a better system of tracing, monitoring, and working with the children.</p> <p>The foster care and residence programs have been in general quite successful. However, even there, local municipalities where the foster care is located are often reluctant to integrate these children into the regular school system.</p> <p>Access to psychosocial assistance professionals is problematic to address the psychological and physical needs of the disengaged CH&A. Health resources are needed as some of the girls are pregnant when they enter the program, and both boys and girls often have some form of venereal disease or AIDS.</p> <p>.</p> <p>The family reunion part of</p>	<p>Establish a system to accompany disengaged CH&A after they leave the ICBF program and support them in job training and placement (similar to the successful pilot project, CRO-J, developed by IOM in 2008).</p> <p>Orient reintegration programs towards education and job training tied to the labor market. (Note: respondents to DI's targeted survey offered this specific recommendation.)</p> <p>The program needs vastly expanded resources and trained professionals to address the physical and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers.</p> <p>A gender component must be built into the programs directly. Women and girls have experienced the conflict and the disengagement process differently than men and boys have in ways that are still not well understood. Sexual abuse, though not limited to girls, has been more common among girls. Special psychosocial attention needs to be placed on the experience of girls in war and all aspects of programming needs to reflect this.</p> <p>The program needs vastly</p>

	<p>Sucio, Cauca. The residential center provides educational and vocational training as well as psychosocial counseling. It operates in much the same manner as the residential facilities in Medellin and Cali run by the Silesian Don Bosco Foundation, which, based on our visit to Don Bosco in Cali, provide a very nurturing and pedagogical environment and has had success with the disengaged CH&A.</p>	<p>the program should continue as reunions were highly successful and the key to helping the disengaged CH&A reconnect and feel part of a family and community.</p> <p>More programs needed that work with indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, modeled where appropriate and with adjustments for local customs and culture. ICBF and OIM could take a lead in expanding the Toribio pilot.</p>	<p>expanded resources and trained professionals to address the physical and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers.</p>
<p>What have been the key challenges and bottlenecks in the GOC child soldiers' reintegration process supported by CHS-F2? What are the key challenges and bottlenecks when disaggregating the information and analysis by gender and ethnic groups?</p>	<p>An unknown percentage of child soldiers return to their own or other communities without going through the ICBF program.</p> <p>The degree of psychosocial trauma among disengaged child combatants has thus far overwhelmed the ability of ICBF to provide trained counselors.</p> <p>The ethnic, gender and community dimensions of the program were all under-developed when compared with their potential. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian CH&A combatants are overrepresented among the ranks of child soldiers as compared with their general numbers in the population.</p> <p>Where possible, families need to be more closely involved. The programs of family visits were highly successful were constrained by limited resources.</p> <p>We simply do not know what happens to most of the</p>	<p>Many of the more comprehensive programs envisioned in the 2012-2015 CHS were not fully developed, including rural and urban models, and a differentiated approach based on ethnicity as well as a cross-cutting gender dimension to all programming.</p> <p>The 2016-2018 program continues to work in these areas, but the context is constantly changing. CH&A continue to be recruited into illegal armed groups, even after the disarming of the FARC. The ELN, FARC dissidents and BACRIM continue to recruit and there will still be a need to develop programs to restore the rights of children who have been victims of illegal recruitment or utilization.</p> <p>There is no political interest to establish a monitoring mechanism for the CH&A who went through the ICBF program,</p>	<p>Expand and consolidate the differential approaches initiated by CHS-F2. ICBF's reintegration strategies would have benefited from a more focused approach-rural or urban, indigenous and Afro-descendent, depending on the background of the CH&A. The reintegration approach used with the Nasa/Toribio community is worth replicating.</p> <p>Directly build a gender component into the programs. Women and girls have experienced the conflict and the disengagement process differently than men and boys, and in ways that are still not understood well enough. Sexual abuse, though not limited to girls, has been more common among girls. Special psychosocial attention needs to be placed on the experience of girls in war and all aspects of programming needs to reflect this.</p>

	<p>CH&A who have gone through the program. ICBF does not keep track of the participants once they turn 18 years old. Most become eligible for reparations according to the Victim's law and are turned over to ARN, but ARN's records are incomplete.</p> <p>There has not been an adequate impact study of the program in general or a full survey of their life trajectories upon completing the programs.</p>	<p>although IOM piloted a successful tracking program in 2008. There is talk of establishing a monitoring mechanism for the 86 CH&A who have been released by the FARC under the terms of the peace process.</p> <p>There is little coordination between the three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A: ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR. A former disengaged youth could potentially interact and receive benefits from all three entities at different times in his/her life. The success of the educational and training opportunities to equip disengaged CH&A with employable skills is also not tracked.</p>	<p>Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence.</p>
<p>What results has CHS-2F achieved in the four key intervention areas (institutional strengthening, assistance to reintegration of child soldiers, prevention of recruitment and knowledge management)?</p>	<p>Assistance to reintegration of child soldiers USAID, IOM, GOC and CHS-2F have collaborated to create greater awareness of child soldiers as a class of victims; facilitated and strengthened the disengagement of CH&A combatants and restitution of rights; advanced policy regarding disengaged CH&A; assisted 990 of former child soldiers to have an opportunity to live fuller and more productive lives; and, supported programs whose funding is being transferred to GOC.</p> <p>Institutional Strengthening and Knowledge Management USAID and IOM worked with ICBF to create and support several "Observatories:" the ICBF Child Welfare Observatory and the</p>	<p>The team found CHS-F2's prevention work with vulnerable youth to be thoughtfully, creatively and intelligently conceived and implemented. The municipal and departmental authorities we visited with in Cali, Villavicencio and Cartagena had all designed programs and public policies for the prevention of youth recruitment. Collectively they covered thousands of vulnerable youths. In general, during the 2012-2015 period, the programs in rural areas were designed for the prevention of recruitment into the illegal armed groups, FARC, ELN and Bacrim.</p> <p>In urban areas, the</p>	<p>Adapt current USAID-IOM "Reintegration Program" to work in the high-priority zones identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict."</p> <p>Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention program but have never been adequately funded.</p> <p>Support the implementation of the updated GOC Conpes on the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon to be released by the Directorate of National Planning</p> <p>Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at</p>

	<p>Observatory of CIPRUNA's Technical Secretariat; these observatories had regional and ethnic focus. However, authorities are not using the data from the Observatories.</p> <p>Prevention of Recruitment The CHS-2F program collaborated with the Technical Secretariat of the new Inter-Sectorial Commission for the Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA) and IOM on implementing prevention plans and working youth integration and social inclusion strategies in Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.</p>	<p>concern from 2012 -2015, and continuing into the present has been the recruitment into gangs, many of which gangs have ties to organized crime or one of the illegal armed groups. All the areas we visited noted a steady upturn in drug consumption throughout the entire period but accelerating post -2015.</p> <p>All of these activities are underfunded and strain for high- level attention from governors, mayors and senior-level national officials. In most cases highly dedicated public servants, professionals and dedicated CSO's and religious groups who make use of the limited resources they have as best they can and deeply appreciate OIM assistance, run them.</p> <p>However aside from anecdotal evidence from the state officials, of youth and partners, there is no data to prove how many youth were saved from joining a criminal group by these programs. However, the effectiveness and wide use of the MVRO was cited several times by CSO partners, municipal and ICBF staff in Cali.</p>	<p>the territorial (local) level,</p> <p>Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and incorporate strategies.</p> <p>Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver for recruitment and use into armed groups</p> <p>Extend USAID's current "Reintegration Program" with IOM to receptor communities where FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating</p> <p>Expand programs for the productive use of CH&A's free time, especially those programs involving sports, arts and cultural and in line with local customs and cultures. (Note respondents to DI's targeted stakeholder survey offered this specific recommendation.)</p> <p>Strengthen and support educational opportunities tied to labor market insertion, as a tool for recruitment prevention and social integration for CH&A. (Note this specific recommendation was offered by respondents to DI's targeted stakeholder survey.)</p> <p>Strengthen the implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level, in close collaboration with local elected and civil society entities, and by focusing on vulnerable youth and the family and community structures that are key to</p>
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			prevention.
Which are the strategic areas in which the international community, especially USAID, can continue to support the GOC to achieve prevention of recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups?	<p>Structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, lack of state presence and social services, and presence of criminal groups and illicit activities that make youth in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment remains largely unchanged.</p> <p>Factors that may led to an increase in recruitment and use of at-risk-youth by criminal groups include: the lack of effective GOC presence in the areas formally controlled by the FARC and the movement of dissident FARC and BACRIMs into these areas, a dramatic increase in coca production over the last several years, the ongoing use of migrant coca-leaf pickers, including CH&A, and increased recruitment and use of CH&A for criminal work in urban areas where drugs, addiction, and poverty are ever-present.</p>	<p>There is an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen the CH&A recruitment prevention program, adapted to the needs of the post-Accord environment.</p> <p>There is great concern with respect to the vacuums of power left by the FARC in the regions that they once dominated. This includes the expansion of other illegal armed groups into these zones. This issue is larger than one of just child recruitment and will require the Colombian government to address these power vacuums through the increase of state presence with investment in security, administration, education, welfare, health and infrastructure.</p>	<p>Adapt current USAID-IOM "Reintegration Program" to work in the high-priority zones identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict."</p> <p>Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention program but have never been adequately funded.</p> <p>Support the implementation of the updated GOC Conpes on the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon to be released by the Directorate of National Planning</p> <p>Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level,</p> <p>Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and incorporate strategies.</p> <p>Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver for recruitment and use into armed groups</p> <p>Extend USAID's current "Reintegration Program" with IOM to receptor communities where FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating</p>

ANNEX E: LIST OF INFORMANTS

Date	Name	Title, Organization	Location
5/12/2017	Juan Manuel Luna	OIM, Coordinador RPR	
5/12/2017	Paula Rivero	OIM, prevención y gestión de conocimiento	
5/12/2017	Sandra Ruiz	OIM, Coordinadora adjunta CHS y ahora de RPR	
5/15/2017	Catalina Zapata	CIPRUNNA, asesora ST y programa "Camino diferencial de vida"	
5/15/2017	Francisco Hurtado	CIPRUNNA, Coordinador Observatorio	
5/15/2017	Juan Pablo Fayad	CIPRUNNA, Coordinador Territorialización	
5/16/2017	Adriana Sánchez Sierra	ICBF, 2. Dirección de Niñez y Adolescencia	
5/16/2017	Catalina Zapata	Asesora (Consejera Presidencial de Derechos Humanos)	
5/16/2017	Julio and Claudia Bueno	ICBF, Observatorio del Bienestar de la Niñez	
5/16/2017	Lisa Gómez	ICBF, Dirección de Protección	
5/16/2017	Paula Gavirina	Consejera Presidencial de Derechos Humanos	
5/16/2017	Viviana Pulido	ICBF, abogada de la Subdirección de Restablecimiento de Derechos	
5/17/2017	Adriana Marín	Encargada de prevención y atención a NNA en riesgo o víctimas del reclutamiento, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje -Sena	Bogotá
5/17/2017	Edgar Zambrano	Coordinador Grupo de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje -Sena	Bogotá
5/17/2017	Gerson Arias	Asesor, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (OACP)	Bogotá
5/18/2017	Camilo Rojas	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, cooperación internacional	
5/18/2017	Daniel Castellanos	Cifras & Conceptos, Subgerente	Bogotá
5/18/2017	Daniel Moreno	Asesor, Coordinadora programa NNA	
5/18/2017	María del Pilar Ruiz	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, Reintegración comunitaria y prevención de reclutamiento	
5/18/2017	María Teresa Pinzón	Coordinadora programa NNA	
5/18/2017	Miguel Suárez	Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, alianzas estratégicas	

5/18/2017	Sandra Pabón	USAID, Colombia	
5/18/2017	Viviana Arias	Cifras & Conceptos, Gerente de proyectos	Bogotá
5/21/2017	Manuela Ramírez	Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz Secretaría Ejecutiva	
5/22/2017	Alexandra Valencia	Magistrada de Tribunal Especial de Justicia y Paz	
5/22/2017	Katherine Herrera	Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV), Coordinadora Niños, niñas y adolescente	
5/24/2017	Grupo Focal	Fundación Paz y Bien	Cali
5/24/2017	Grupo Focal	Don Bosco	Cali
5/24/2017	Mirta Patricia Trillos	ICBF, Defensoría de Desvinculados, Defensora de Familia	Cali
5/24/2017	Rocío Gutiérrez	Alcaldía de Cali, Secretaría de Paz y Cultura Ciudadana	Cali
5/25/2017	Carmelina	Mamá de María Teresa, artesana	Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017	Florentino	Desmovilizado, Vicepresidente Organización de Turismo y tiene posada turística	Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017	Gabriel Pavi	exgobernador	Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017	Jeremías	joven desvinculado, participa en el proyecto de Ecoturismo	Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017	Luis Yimer Pavi	docente IE El Sesteadero	Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017	María Teresa	joven desvinculada y desmovilizada [doble reclusión], líder organización de mujeres	Santander de Quilichao
5/26/2017	Catalina Benjumea	Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande	Cali
5/26/2017	David Santos	CIPRUNNA, Agente Local	Cali
5/26/2017	Fabio Cardozo	Secretaría de Paz y Reconciliación, Secretario	Cali
5/26/2017	Jaime Quevedo	Director, Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande	Cali
5/26/2017	Neysa Luz Silvia	Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande	Cali
5/26/2017	Rector – [no anoté el nombre del rector]	Ciudadela Educativa Isaías Duarte Cancino	Cali
5/30/2017	Luz Mila Cardona	Defensoría del Pueblo – Primera Infancia	Bogotá
5/31/2017	Ana Carmenza Molano	ICBF, Dirección de Protección	
6/1/2017	Diana Moreno	Ministerio de Educación Nacional	
6/1/2017	Luz Aidé Pachón	Ministerio de Educación Nacional	
6/2/2017	David Rincón	Pandi	Bogotá
6/2/2017	Rocio Rubio	Experta en NNA víctimas del conflicto	Bogotá
6/2/2017	Vanessa Acevedo	Pandi	Bogotá
6/2/2017	Ximena Norato Palomeque	Directora, Pandi	Bogotá
6/7/2017	Danela Sogamoso	Defensora de Familia, Defensoría del Pueblo	Villavicencio
6/7/2017	Irma Bejarano	Gerente de DDHH, Secretaría de Víctimas, Derechos Humanos y Paz, Gobernación del Meta	Villavicencio
6/8/2017	Erika Andrea Duque Giraldo	Madre sustituta (ONG Crecer en Familia)	Villavicencio
6/8/2017	John Alexander Granada	Coordinador modalidad Hogar Tutor – ONG Crecer en Familia	Villavicencio
6/8/2017	Luis Bastidas	Profesional territorial Gerente de Víctimas, Secretaría de Víctimas, Derechos Humanos y Paz, Gobernación del Meta	Villavicencio

ANNEX F: MONITORING DATA ANALYSIS

1. Reintegration

The CHS-F2 reintegration component is measured through five monitor indicators listed below on Table 1.

TABLE 5. REINTEGRATION INDICATORS

Code	Indicators	FY2012-FY2015		
		Target (a)	Actual (b)	Results (b/a)
DO2-13	Number of child soldiers identified	880	990	113%
DO2-09	Percentage of disengaged child soldiers receiving tailored services	63%	22%	35%
APE-24	Number of child and youth excombatants assisted by the ICBF program of Specialized Assistance participating in activities designed to strengthen families.	300	304	101%
APE-36	Number of disengaged CH&A receiving assistance through socio-familial and community models	500	609	122%
APE-37	Number of community-based models implemented	3	na	na

Source: Monitor

Analysis

- CFS-F2 supported the total universe or 990 disengaged child soldiers (CH&A) that were enrolled in ICBF's Specialized Assistance Program during CHS-F2 period.⁴
- In 2015, CHS-F2 provided services to 500 disengaged CH&A through the socio-familial and community models. The PMP states that three community-based models were implemented. While the three models were apparently successfully implemented, the qualitative data shows that only the NASA indigenous-community model continues to function. It has not been replicated in other indigenous or non-indigenous rural contexts in Colombia.
- CHS-F2 targeted services with a "differential or tailored approach" to 63% of the disengaged CH&A, ending the period with only 22% on average. The differential approach includes assistance through the socio-familial/family and community models, and tailored services to girls and ethnic groups. These results are consistent with the interviews and focus groups conducted by the team that show that a differential gender approach is weak to non-existent in ICBF's program and that differential services are only provided to indigenous communities through the NASA community model and Ingruma model, but not to other ethnic groups.

⁴ Monitor does not have data for the indicator DO2-13 during FY2012.

- The importance of the family structure to support the reintegration process of CH&A and to protect vulnerable children from recruitment and use by illegal groups in general is a key conclusion of this evaluation. For this reason, it is important to point out that the CHS-F2 program developed ICBF's methodology to organize family reunifications. CHS-F2 also financed family reunification meetings between 300 CHS&A and a family member in FY2012. Unfortunately, there is no data for other years. Beyond these results, qualitative data indicate that ICBF faces budget restrictions and limitations to carry out two family reunification meetings scheduled for 2017.

M&E recommendations

- Disaggregate indicator APE-36 between the number of disengaged CH&A receiving socio-familiar assistance and the number of disengaged CH&A receiving assistance through the community models. These are totally different models that merit individual assessment.
- The concept of “differential or tailored services” is not clear in the Indicator DO2-09, as was inferred in this evaluation from CHS 27th Quarterly (page 8). Also, this indicator has the problem that it includes socio-familiar and community models, the same as Indicator APE-36.
- To measure sustainability, indicators should be calculated during the complete program period (in this case 2012-2015). For example, it would have been very useful to this analysis to measure the Indicator APE-24 during 2013, 2014 and 2015.

1. Prevention

CHS-F2's prevention component is measured through four monitor indicators listed below on **Table 6**.

TABLE 6. PREVENTION INDICATORS

Code	Indicator	FY2012-FY2015		
		<i>Target (a)</i>	<i>Actual (b)</i>	<i>Results (b/a)</i>
DO2-14	Number of youth at risk that benefit from prevention strategies	27,000	106,053	393%
APE-08	Number of residents in target municipalities who receive prevention messages	11,600	9,341	81%
APE-07	Number of target municipalities implementing prevention plans	98	46	47%
APE-35	Number of prevention plans with implementation monitored	70	50	71%

Source: Monitor

Analysis

- The prevention indicator that was measured each year during the CHS-F2 period is “Number of youth at risk that benefit from prevention strategies”, a total of 106,553 youth benefited from the program which was 4 youth over the target. The challenge to analyze this indicator is that prevention strategies are very diverse with different intensity, exposure and impact. According to people interviewed at the national and local levels, prevention activities are brief and isolated and do not produce a structural change in most instances. This is also a lesson learned by the CHS-F2 and in subsequent IOM

programming in 2016-2017, IOM adopted the strategy of focusing several prevention interventions⁵ in a single municipality. This was explained to the team by USAID and observed in the municipality of Villavicencio.

- The other indicators address the implementation of prevention plans at the local level. Forty-six plans, supported by the CHS-F2 were implemented in 2014-2015 and IOM designed the prevention strategy methodology Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Mapping (VROM.) It was cited in several interviews as a very useful knowledge methodology transferred by the CHS-F2. Local governments, such as Cali and Villavicencio, currently use the VROM methodology to design their prevention strategies. CIPRUNA's Technical Secretariat also monitored these plans, with support by CHS-F2. In addition, monitoring activities were aimed to facilitate the inter-institutional coordination among different institutions at the local level. Fifty plans were monitored during CHF-F2 timeline.

M&E Recommendations

- The indicator “Number of youth at risk that benefit from prevention strategies” could be desegregated by the type of prevention activity implemented. Also, as evaluation strategy, a pre and post could be applied to measure a direct change generated by prevention activities.
- The three prevention indicators included in the monitor with data for a single year have the potential to be measured during an extended period. These indicators are: i) Percentage of targeted CH&A in high risk areas with basic rights guaranteed, ii) Number of boys, girls, adolescents, and youths participating in recruitment prevention activities, and iii) Employment Opportunities.

2. Knowledge Management

CHS-F2 knowledge management component is measured through five monitor indicators listed below in **Table 7.**

TABLE 7. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT INDICATORS

Code	Indicators	FY2012-FY2015		
		Target (a)	Actual (a)	Results (b/a)
APE-09	Number of knowledge management products used by public officials	30	35	117%
APE-30	Number of analytical documents on the forced recruitment of boys, girls, and adolescents	8	22	275%
APE-12	Number of analyses and fora led by GOC observatories	74	83	112%
APE-38	Number of people who participate in processes to share knowledge products on peace pedagogy	150	287	191%
APE-11	Number of models transferred to GOC institutions	6	2	33%

Source: Monitor

⁵ These activities are: i) World Coach; ii) Clubes de Lectura/Reading or Book Clubs(Fundación Rafael Pombo); iii) Familia Ayara, culture, art, pop y grafiti, y iv) Techno Kits (Fundación Challenger), formación para producción de tecnología/training for technology production.

All but one of the knowledge management indicators showed results higher than targets. These results confirm that the production of documents, analysis, forums and other knowledge products, supported by CHS-F2 was higher than expected. There is no indicator measuring the use and impact of the knowledge products. Interviews and focus groups showed that these knowledge products could have been transferred and used more effectively so as to have more impact in decision-making. So far, the knowledge product on targeted municipalities for prevention activities is the product most frequently used by CIPRUNNA observatory partners.

The only indicator that did not meet its target is “Number of models transferred to GOC institutions”, (only 2 models out of 6 were transferred to GOC institutions.). As mentioned, the knowledge management transfers most valued by GOC interviewees are family meetings and the Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Mapping methodology. However, key model as NASA community reintegration experience was not transferred during CHS-F2 to other indigenous or rural communities.

3. Institutional Strengthening

Institutional strengthening indicators measured by the monitor do not allow DI to carry out an analysis about the results of CHS-F2. The indicator that has more information is “Percentage of institutional strengthening for ICBFs Assistance Program and CIPRUNA’s operations.” However, this data has an enormous variability among years, from 10% in FY2013 to 0% in FY2014 and then 38% in FY2015. On the other hand, there are indicators that do not have “actual” data or the data is only reported in one year. This is the case of indicators such as: “Index on incorporation of tailored approach in ICBF policy” and “Number of activities implemented with a differential approach.” Finally, there are two indicators related to the GOC’s financial contribution (“Percentage of public resources financing the ICBFs Specialized Assistance Program operation and “Percentage of public resources financing the operations of CIPRUNA’s Technical Secretariat”). In both cases the percentage does not exceed 5%.

In this scenario, the qualitative information gathered in this evaluation are more useful than the quantitative information to analysis the results of institutional strengthening component of the CHS-F2 program.

ANNEX H: TARGETED BENEFICIARY SURVEY

This targeted stakeholder survey is part of the quantitative data collection methods employed to answer CHS-F2 evaluation questions, specifically those related to recruitment prevention (EQ4 and EQ5). The survey was applied in an online format by sending emails to targeted officials in Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions and Colombian non-government organizations with a link routed to the survey that was stored on a google platform.

The survey was sent to 29 institutions and 53 individuals on July 27th, 2017 and the survey site was open for 13 days. The response rate was very high for an online survey: 72.4% of institutions responded to the survey and 60.4% of the officials, for a total of 32 surveys collected.

TABLE 8. SURVEY SAMPLE AND RESPONSE RATE

Population	Targeted sample	Final sample	Coverage
Institutions	29	21	72.4%
Officials	53	32	60.4%

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

78.2% of the officials reached by this survey were from national government institutions that have responsibilities related to the prevention of recruitment of CH&A by illegal groups. The other survey respondents were from civil society and media-related groups (12.5%), public ministry institutions (6.3%) and the international community (3.1%), as is shown on Table 2. An important feature of this survey is that officials included in the sample were identified from two sources; first, a list provided by the GOC's Comisión Intersectorial de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (CIPRUNNA); second, a list of people that DI's evaluation team interviewed during the qualitative field work (KII list). Of the 32 completed surveys, 18 respondents are from the CIPRUNNA list (56.2%) and 14 respondents are from the key informant interview (KII) list (43.8%). This difference is taken into the analysis because people that were closer to the CHS implementation are in the KII list, and most of them were identified by USAID and IOM as key informants. By contrast, in the CIPRUNNA list, there are people that are working currently in recruitment prevention, but were not necessarily involved with CHS-F2 in the period 2012-2015. This is because there is high turnover and few career employees in GOC institutions.

TABLE 9. TYPE OF TARGETED INSTITUTIONS

Institution type	CIPRUNNA list	KII list	Total
National government – ministries	50,0%	7,1%	31,3%
National government - other entities	38,9%	57,1%	46,9%
Public Ministry	11,1%	-	6,3%
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups	-	28,6%	12,5%

International community	-	7,1%	3,1%
Number of respondents	18	14	32

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

Characteristics of survey respondents are shown on Table 3. The survey was answered mainly by women (56.2%), one third are officials with executive duties, 83.3% of respondents have 2 or more years in their current jobs, and almost all respondents work in Bogotá (87.5%).

TABLE 10. RESPONDENTS' CHARACTERISTICS

Variables	CIPRUNNA list	KII list	Total
% Men	38,9%	50,0%	43,8%
% of executive officers	16,7%	50,0%	31,3%
% officials with employment of 2 or more years in current position	88,9%	71,4%	81,3%
% of officials working in Bogotá	100,0%	71,4%	87,5%
Number of respondents	18	14	32

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

The first survey question dealt with knowledge of CHS support. 65.6% of the officers reported being familiar with CHS support. As expected, CHS is better known by KII officers and those with more labor seniority (Table 4).

TABLE 11. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CHS SUPPORT

Time in the current job	CIPRUNNA list	KII List	Total
5 years or more	37,5%	100%	64,3%
4 years	100%		100,0%
3 years	100%	100%	100,0%
2 years	0%	100%	25,0%
1 years	0%	100%	50,0%
Less than 1 year	0%	66,7%	50,0%
Total	44,4%	92,9%	65,6%

Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

13 out of 29 institutions answered that they received direct support from the CHS program, or at least that they have partner institutions that are direct CHS beneficiaries (these institutions are listed on Table 12). This implies that the other institutions that responded to the survey have not received CHS support and do not work closely with institutions supported by CHS.

TABLE 12. INSTITUTIONS (OR PARTNERS) WITH CHS SUPPORT


Institution type	Institution name
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National government – ministries	MINDEFENSA, MINCULTURA
National government - other entities	ICBF, Colombia Joven, Sena, Agencia para la Reincorporación, Consejería DDHH, Policía Nacional
Public Ministry	Defensoría del Pueblo,
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups	Agencia Pandi, Fundación Juan Felipe Gómez Escobar, Tiempo de Juego, World Coach Colombia
International community	UNICEF
Number of respondents	18

Source: *Democracy International survey, 2017*

For the 13 CHS institutions on Table 12, officials reported that the list of five institutions with which they coordinate on recruitment prevention activities. The ICBF was highlighted as the institution with more institutional networks: 83% of the officials (from the 13 institutions supported by CHS) mentioned the ICBF as part of their interinstitutional coordination network. This percentage is higher than expected, given that in the quantitative data, ICBF was more associated with reintegration activities rather than prevention activities. The other institutions were mentioned less frequently, with percentages below 40%. It is worth noting that the CIPRUNNA secretariat is mentioned only by 39% of the officers, a finding that is consistent with qualitative data. Finally, IOM is mentioned by one third of the 13 CHS institutions (Chart 1).


CHART 1. INTERINSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION OF INSTITUTIONS (OR PARTNERS) WITH CHS SUPPORT



Source: *Democracy International survey, 2017*

Officials were asked to grade the contribution of CHS on 3 components: recruitment prevention, institutional strengthening, and knowledge management. Chart 2 shows the results related to recruitment prevention. Officials from the KII list had a more positive assessment of CHS contribution than those from the CIPRUNNA list. While officials that were interviewed during the qualitative fieldwork affirmed that CHS had a high and decisive impact on recruitment prevention, none of the CIPRUNNA respondents thought the impact was decisive. . A majority of officials from this list (60%) responded that CHS had an impact, and the rest stated that CHS had only some impact on recruitment prevention.


CHART 2. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO RECRUITMENT PREVENTION



Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

A 10 point scale was used (1 meaning the lowest contribution and 10 the highest) to grade CHS's contribution for institutional strengthening. Results are divided, as shown on Chart 3, following the same pattern found for recruitment prevention: KII's officials gave higher grades (77% responded between 8 and 10) than those surveyed from CIPRUNNA list (80% responded 5 or less).


CHART 3. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING



Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

CHS's contribution to knowledge management has better results than its contribution to institutional strengthening. CHS contribution was graded above 8 for 77% of the officials in the KII list and 40% from the CIPRUNNA list. In this analysis, it is assumed that respondents answered this question assessing the performance of the CIPRUNNA observatory, which was highlighted in several interviews as very important for targeting municipalities that have high request for prevention programs (Chart 4).

CHART 4. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT



Source: Democracy International survey, 2017

This survey included four open question related two themes: i) CHS's strengths and weaknesses, and ii) recommendations related to the recruitment prevention policy in a post conflict context and to USAID strategies for the next five years (Table 13). Responds to these open questions were coded to be analyzed.

TABLE 13. SURVEY OPEN QUESTIONS

Categories	Survey questions
CHS strengths	<i>En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales FORTALEZAS del apoyo que OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA)?</i>
CHS weaknesses	<i>En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales DEBILIDADES del apoyo que OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA)?</i>
Public policy recommendations in post conflict context	<i>¿Cómo se debe reorientar la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) en el contexto de implementación de los acuerdos de paz con las FARC?</i>
Recommendations to USAID	<i>¿Cuáles son las tres principales áreas estratégicas en las cuales la comunidad internacional, especialmente USAID, debería continuar apoyando al Gobierno de Colombia para prevenir el reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) en los próximos 5 años?</i>

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CHS

The main strengths of the support that IOM has provided to the entities with which it works for the implementation of the policy on recruitment prevention, usage and sexual violence against children and adolescents (NNA) are divided into five categories and can be found on Table 14.

TABLE 14. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CHS

Strengths	Weaknesses
Professional advice and technical assistance	The continuity of the processes, the officials and the measurement of results is very low
Great capacity for institutional strengthening through the provision of financial resources	There is a need for broader coverage of the program
Support to the consolidation of the infrastructure necessary to carry out the program	Dissemination of the results has not been optimal
The program gave more visibility to the issue of recruitment	
Prominent management	

First of all, IOM provided professional advice and technical assistance in strategic areas of the program. Second, the IOM aided institutional strengthening through the provision of financial resources for research, analysis and promotion of human rights. Third, IOM supported institutions to procure the infrastructure necessary to advance the prevention activities by investing in equipment and providing kitchens and robotics equipment. The fourth strength is that the program gave more visibility to the issue of recruitment, increasing overall understanding about children's rights and acceptance of vulnerable CH&A as victims of the conflict. Finally, IOM's management was crucial for achieving greater inter-agency coordination and strategic allies for the program.

However, the CHS stakeholders also emphasized that there is a lack of the continuity of the processes, the GOC officials and the measurement of results. Additionally, there is a need for broader coverage of the program in terms of vulnerable population, regions with poor accessibility; and longer periods of intervention. Finally, a weakness of the program is that the dissemination of the results and knowledge management has low coverage, which reduces the impact and use in policy design.

STAKEHOLDER RECOMMENDATIONS

The main policy recommendations and recommendation for USAID given by the stakeholders can be found on Table 15.

TABLE 15. STAKEHOLDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Recommendations	Recommendations for USAID
Strengthening institutional capacity	Programs regarding education for the labor insertion to the productive sectors and use of the free time should be supported and strengthened, especially those involving sports, arts and cultural formation with a territorial, cultural and ethnic approach
The GOC presence should be reinforced in areas formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla	
Reintegration programs should be oriented towards education and job training	
It is important to include the children and adolescents in the design of the public policy in each territory	
Adopt a community-based approach	

The policy on recruitment prevention in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla must be reoriented mainly towards strengthening institutional capacity. This is important since it is an integral part of the peace agreements and is crucial for coordination, initiatives and work with local authorities, efficient use of resources for road-map protocols and the strengthening of investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. Thus, the presence of the government can be reinforced in areas formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla in order to prevent children from being used or linked to illegal groups or to new criminal modalities.

Likewise, for the design of reintegration programs, in addition to adopting a community-based approach, it is essential to contemplate regional, cultural and ethnic differences. These programs should be oriented towards education and job training to provide support in productive activities and the empowerment of children. For this purpose, it is important to include the children and adolescents in the design of the public policy in each territory.

Furthermore, in the strategic areas in which USAID should continue to support the Government of Colombia to prevent recruitment, use and sexual violence against children in the next 5 years, most institutions agree that programs regarding education for the labor insertion to the productive sectors and the use of free time should be supported and strengthened, especially those involving sports, arts and cultural formation with a territorial, cultural and ethnic approach.

